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STRUCTURAL BARRIERS TO INCLUSION IN
ARBITRATOR POOLS
Nicole G. Iannarone*
Abstract: Critics increasingly challenge mandatory arbitration because the pools from
which decisionmakers are selected are neither diverse nor inclusive. Evaluating diversity and
inclusion in arbitrator pools is difficult due to the black box nature of mandatory arbitration.
This Article evaluates inclusion in arbitrator pools through a case study on securities
arbitration. The Article relies upon the relatively greater transparency of the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority (FINRA) forum. It begins by describing the unique role that small claims
securities arbitration plays in maintaining investor trust and confidence in the securities
markets before describing why ensuring that the FINRA arbitrator pool is both diverse and
inclusive is necessary for legitimacy. The Article then evaluates the forum’s arbitrator selection
protocol and identifies barriers that may prevent newer entrants, who have diversified the
arbitrator roster, from presiding over consumer investors’ claims. Using publicly available
information, it then evaluates whether newly recruited arbitrators presided over smaller
customer claims that concluded after a hearing from 2015 to 2019. The results indicate that
only 0.98% of decisions in smaller claim investor cases were rendered by arbitrators who first
appeared in FINRA’s awards database after diversity recruitment efforts began in 2015.
Though FINRA has diversified its arbitrator roster, few small investors receive the benefit of
new entrants. The results illustrate the limits of transparency and the need for additional
information to evaluate whether arbitrator pools are inclusive. The Article concludes with
interventions to permit evaluation of diversification efforts and eliminate barriers to inclusion
in arbitrator pools. The case study and resultant recommendations provide guidance that may
serve as best practices for consumer arbitration forums wishing to ensure transparency and
inclusion in their arbitrator pools.
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INTRODUCTION
Forums that host mandatory consumer arbitration are increasingly
facing pressure for failing to maintain diverse arbitrator rosters.1 For
example, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), a quasigovernmental self-regulatory organization that is overseen by the U.S.

1. See generally AM. ASS’N FOR JUST., WHERE WHITE MEN RULE: HOW THE SECRETIVE SYSTEM
FORCED ARBITRATION HURTS WOMEN AND MINORITIES (2021) [hereinafter AAJ ARBITRATOR
DIVERSITY REPORT], https://www.justice.org/resources/research/forced-arbitration-hurts-womenand-minorities [https://perma.cc/DPK4-V438] (describing lack of diverse arbitrator pools at the
American Arbitration Association (AAA), JAMS, and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(FINRA) and lack of diverse arbitrators deciding cases even when they appear on arbitrator selection
lists); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Arbitrator Diversity: Can It Be Achieved?, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 965, 969
(2021) [hereinafter Cole, Arbitrator Diversity] (“Arbitration critics correctly observe that the
arbitrator corps does not reflect the racial, ethnic, or gender diversity present in society at large.”).
OF
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Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and hosts the largest
securities arbitration forum in the country,2 has come under fire for
maintaining a roster that critics claim is overwhelmingly white and male.3
Nearly all disputes between an investor and stockbroker are subject to
mandatory arbitration in the FINRA Dispute Resolution Services forum.4
The near mandatory nature of the FINRA arbitration forum, coupled with
its transparency and public accountability, position the forum as a unique
case study for evaluating arbitrator pool diversity and instituting
measurable change.5 In 2014, the Public Investor Advocate Bar
Association (PIABA), a bar association whose members represent
investors in claims against stockbrokers in the FINRA forum,6 issued a
report on the composition of FINRA’s arbitrator roster, concluding that
the FINRA roster was insufficiently diverse.7 The PIABA Report found
that of the 5,375 arbitrators then in FINRA’s pool, 80% were male.8
PIABA found that the average arbitrator age was sixty-seven and that 40%
of the roster was over the age of seventy.9 The PIABA Report asserted
that FINRA’s claims that it maintained a diverse arbitrator roster were
incorrect.10 PIABA further criticized FINRA for failing to take any
measures to quantify diversity within its arbitrator roster while
simultaneously claiming that the roster was diverse.11
Since the 2014 PIABA Report, in response to scholarly and internal
2. About FINRA, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/about [https://perma.cc/RT2L-WSLS] (“FINRA is
a government-authorized not-for-profit organization that oversees U.S. broker-dealers. . . . FINRA is
authorized by Congress to protect America’s investors by making sure the broker-dealer industry
operates fairly and honestly. We oversee more than 624,000 brokers across the country—and analyze
billions of daily market events.”); AAJ ARBITRATOR DIVERSITY REPORT, supra note 1.
3. See JASON R. DOSS, PUB. INVS. ARB. BAR ASS’N, THE IMPORTANCE OF ARBITRATOR
DISCLOSURE (2014) [hereinafter PIABA REPORT], https://piaba.org/sites/default/files/newsroom/20
14-10/The%20Importance%20of%20Arbitrator%20Disclosure%20(October%207,%202014).pdf
[https://perma.cc/GR5Z-Q2PB].
4. See FINRA, RULE 12200 (2008); Jill I. Gross, The End of Mandatory Securities Arbitration?, 30
PACE L. REV. 1174, 1179 (2010) [hereinafter Gross, The End of Mandatory Securities Arbitration?]
(describing securities industry arbitration forum and near universal arbitration of customer disputes
against industry members before FINRA Dispute Resolution); Michael S. Barr, Mandatory
Arbitration in Consumer Finance and Investor Contracts, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 793, 801 (2015)
(“The vast bulk of disputes between broker-dealers and their clients involve arbitration . . . .”).
5. Gross, The End of Mandatory Securities Arbitration?, supra note 4, at 1179 (describing
mandatory nature of FINRA arbitration); About FINRA, supra note 2 (describing SEC oversight of
FINRA).
6. PIABA REPORT, supra note 3, at 1 n.1.
7. Id. at 24.
8. Id. at 28.
9. Id. at 28–29.
10. Id. at 24.
11. Id.
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recommendations,12 FINRA has increased transparency with regard to its
arbitrator pool demographics,13 an action that may permit the assessment
of FINRA’s diversification efforts and potentially serve as a model for
other arbitration forums.14 FINRA now maintains a webpage listing
Dispute Resolution Service’s efforts to ensure its arbitrator pool is
inclusive.15 FINRA conducts a voluntary annual survey of its arbitrator
pool to obtain information on the race, ethnicity, gender, age, and LGBTQ
identity of its arbitrators and shares aggregate demographic information
with the public.16 These actions to highlight efforts to diversify the
roster—both in outreach and measurable change—indicate a greater
degree of transparency within FINRA than other arbitral forums.17
Moreover, these efforts suggest a commitment to ensuring that investors
have access to an arbitrator pool that is diverse.18 Accordingly, to the
extent FINRA’s transparency permits analysis of inclusion, FINRA’s
work may serve as model for other mandatory arbitration forums.
Approximately five years after it had been criticized for its own lack of
diversity, FINRA responded to publicity surrounding entrepreneur and
rapper Shawn Carter’s (also known as Jay-Z) challenge to the American
Arbitration Association (AAA) as an arbitration forum because AAA

12. See, e.g., FINRA DISP. RESOL. TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
FINRA DISPUTE RESOLUTION TASK FORCE 8 (2015), https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/FinalDR-task-force-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/GMJ5-T53S] (“[T]he task force heard criticisms about the
lack of diversity in the FINRA arbitrator pool and agrees that diversity must be increased.”); Benjamin
P. Edwards, FINRA’s Diversity Dilemma, INVESTMENTNEWS (Nov. 23, 2014),
https://www.investmentnews.com/finras-diversity-dilemma-59905 [https://perma.cc/3Z77-SUSC]
(“Finra [sic] should seek to make the arbitration pool more diverse.”).
13. See, e.g., Nicole G. Iannarone, Finding Light in Arbitration’s Dark Shadow, 4 NEV. L.J.F. 1,
6–7 (2020) [hereinafter Iannarone, Finding Light] (describing FINRA’s transparency in reporting
arbitrator diversity and FINRA studies undertaken to measure diversity).
14. See, e.g., Final Interagency Policy Statement Establishing Joint Standards for Assessing the
Diversity Policies and Practice of Entities Regulated by the Agencies, 80 Fed. Reg. 33,016, 33,024
(June 10, 2015) (“Transparency and publicity are important aspects of assessing diversity policies and
practices.”).
15. Our Commitment to Achieving Arbitrator and Mediator Diversity at FINRA, FINRA,
https://www.finra.org/arbitration-mediation/our-commitment-achieving-arbitrator-and-mediatordiversity-finra [https://perma.cc/NLM2-MNXL].
16. Id.
17. Id. (detailing results of FINRA arbitrator diversity surveys from 2016 to 2020 and breaking
down arbitrator identity by age, gender, race, ethnicity, and LGBTQ identification); Roster Diversity
& Inclusion, AM. ARB. ASS’N, https://www.adr.org/RosterDiversity [https://perma.cc/QTQ8-MBP7]
(describing that 27% of arbitrators are women and people of color without providing a breakdown of
gender, racial, or ethnic identities); see also Gross, The End of Mandatory Securities Arbitration?,
supra note 4, at 1188 (“FINRA Dispute Resolution actively promotes transparency of the arbitration
process.”).
18. Our Commitment, supra note 15.
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lacked sufficient Black arbitrators on its roster.19 FINRA suggested that
its arbitrator roster exhibited more overall diversity than the AAA and that
Carter would not have levied a similar challenge in the FINRA forum.20
FINRA’s Office of Dispute Resolution Director said that “arbitrator
diversity has been his ‘absolute number-one priority’ since taking on his
role on Dec[ember] 1, 2014,” soon after the October 2014 publication of
the PIABA Report.21 By capitalizing on press generated by Carter’s
fame,22 FINRA highlighted the work it had done to diversify its own
arbitrator roster, but that does not mean that we should accept FINRA’s
claim that its roster is diverse at face value.23 Indeed, not all agree that
FINRA’s arbitrator roster has sufficiently diversified since PIABA’s 2014
report.24
FINRA’s assertions that its roster has changed are subject to study, with
some limitations, from publicly available information.25 While it is not
possible to identify each arbitrator currently in FINRA’s arbitrator pool,
let alone that arbitrator’s age, race, ethnicity, gender, or LGBTQ

19. Rita Raagas De Ramos, What Jay-Z Wants, Finra Insists It Already Has, FIN. ADVISOR IQ (Feb.
8, 2019), https://financialadvisoriq.com/c/2196683/263053/what_wants_finra_insists_already?referr
er_module=mos [https://perma.cc/P6NM-7FZE].
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Cole, Arbitrator Diversity, supra note 1, at 994 (“[T]he arbitrator selection process rarely
inspires the kind of headlines that Jay-Z’s case generated . . . .”).
23. FINRA notes, for example, that it has work to do. Raagas De Ramos, supra note 19 (quoting
Richard Berry, FINRA Office of Dispute Resolution Director, stating “[t]his is something we have
been working on for a long time, and it’s part of our effort to continuously improve. You know, at the
end of the day, we will never be done improving this program.”); Office of Dispute Resolution (ODR)
and FINRA News, 1 NEUTRAL CORNER (FINRA, New York, NY), 2020, at 2,
https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/2020-03/neutral-corner-volume-1-2020-0331.pdf [https://
perma.cc/B7YG-86WF] (“While we are encouraged by these results and the incremental progress that
has been made, we recognize that achieving our diversity goals is a long-term effort to which we will
remain fully committed in the years ahead.”).
24. See, e.g., Megan Leonhardt, The Huge Diversity Issue Hiding in Companies’ Forced
Arbitration
Agreements,
CNBC:
MAKE
IT
(June
7,
2021,
1:54
PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/07/arbitrators-are-male-and-overwhelming-white-heres-why-itmatters.html [https://perma.cc/DN7Z-GKCG] (highlighting an AAJ report finding that AAA, JAMS,
and FINRA, “three of the largest arbitration service providers in the country, are mostly male and
overwhelmingly white”); FINRA Could Learn from Jay-Z’s Demand for Diversity in Arbitration,
GREEN & SCHAFLE LLC (Feb. 11, 2019), https://broker-misconduct.com/blog/2019/2/11/find-couldlearn-from-jay-zs-demand-for-racial-equality-in-arbitration [https://perma.cc/QD2P-WE8B]
(describing continued lack of diversity in FINRA arbitrator pool).
25. See generally Iannarone, Finding Light, supra note 13 (discussing FINRA’s public disclosures
and urging additional data disclosure); Charlotte S. Alexander & Nicole G. Iannarone, Winning
Defined? Text-Mining Arbitration Decisions, 42 CARDOZO L. REV. 1695 (2021) (using computational
text analysis to study FINRA arbitration awards).
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identity,26 it is possible to measure whether new arbitrators are being
chosen to serve and actually decide smaller investors’ disputes.27 This
Article assesses—to the extent possible via FINRA’s voluntary
transparency—the results of FINRA’s recent arbitrator recruitment
gains.28 Limiting the inquiry to publicly available information released by
FINRA is intentional. This Article fits into a broader research agenda
assessing whether the information publicly released by FINRA in the
name of transparency is meaningful.29 It also serves to inform other
arbitration forums about how providing transparency can assist external
evaluation of diversification and inclusion efforts and potentially increase
public trust.
FINRA’s assertions that it has increased the diversity of its roster since
2014 cannot be wholly assessed, because FINRA does not publicly release
the names and individual demographic details of the members of its
arbitration roster.30 However, FINRA does release decisions in its
arbitration cases.31 These awards provide sufficient information to
determine whether arbitrators who joined after 2014—when FINRA faced
criticism for a lack of diversity and began releasing arbitrator
demographic information showing an overall more diverse pool—serve
26. See Final Interagency Policy Statement Establishing Joint Standards for Assessing the Diversity
Policies and Practice of Entities Regulated by the Agencies, 80 Fed. Reg. 33,016, 33,021 (June 10,
2015) (“Agencies may publish information disclosed to them provided they do not identify a
particular . . . individual . . . in an effort to balance concerns about confidentiality of information with
the importance of sharing information.”).
27. FINRA claims under $100,000 are decided by one arbitrator who has served on enough
arbitration proceedings to qualify as a chair-qualified arbitrator. See infra section III.B (describing
arbitrator selection and qualification). These single-arbitrator cases are the focus of this Article given
the importance of smaller claims arbitration to the development of the overall mandatory securities
system. See infra Part I. Moreover, smaller investors are more likely to be members of
underrepresented groups. See infra section II.A.
28. The author anticipates further exploring this question by evaluating quasi-public information,
specifically the arbitrator disclosure reports provided to the parties in arbitration, in future work.
29. See, e.g., Iannarone, Finding Light, supra note 13 (describing the need to conduct research into
the extent of FINRA’s transparency); Alexander & Iannarone, supra note 25 (describing research
plans for computational text analysis of FINRA awards and BrokerCheck).
30. Iannarone, Finding Light, supra note 13, at 6; Arbitrator Disclosure, FINRA,
https://www.finra.org/arbitration-mediation/arbitrator-disclosure [https://perma.cc/H8LL-M6NG]
(describing arbitrator disclosure reports “provided to parties to help them make informed decisions
during the arbitrator selection process”); Sample Arbitrator Disclosure Report, FINRA (Sept. 27,
2011), https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/ArbMed/p122952.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NBLDNML] (sample disclosure report does not detail arbitrator demographic information). FINRA
releases information on the number of arbitrators available to serve in each of its hearing locations.
See Hearing Location Statistics, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/arbitration-mediation/disputeresolution-statistics/hearing-location-statistics [https://perma.cc/Y9W2-C9WU].
31. See, e.g., Arbitration Awards Online, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/arbitrationmediation/arbitration-awards [https://perma.cc/RM39-27M4] (database containing FINRA
arbitration awards).
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as the sole arbitrators deciding the smallest customer disputes.32
Every FINRA arbitration that results in a decision by an arbitrator is
published in a publicly available database maintained on FINRA’s
website.33 Each award must include, among other uniform information,
the name(s) of the arbitrator(s) issuing the award.34 Thus, it is possible to
determine whether FINRA’s addition of more arbitrators reflective of the
population has led to any change in who is presiding over smaller investor
claims. This Article tests the hypothesis that structural barriers within
FINRA’s arbitrator selection process make it difficult for a new entrant to
the FINRA public arbitrator roster to be selected as an arbitrator in small
claim proceedings filed against a stockbroker. Thus, the Article assesses
inclusion—whether new entrants to FINRA’s arbitrator pool preside over
smaller cases as the sole arbitrator.35
Part I analyzes the historic roots of securities arbitration, identifying
the fair resolution of smaller consumer claims as the most important focus
in creating a uniform, and now mandatory, dispute resolution system to
ensure trust in the markets. If consumers did not believe they could fairly
and efficiently resolve their disputes, they would not trust the securities
markets. The unique oversight and accountability of FINRA’s forum thus
sets it apart from other mandatory arbitration forums, making it an
interesting case study due to the possibility of constituent- and regulatorled change. Part II explores the historic lack of diversity in the financial
industry and examines how lack of representation within it undermines
consumer trust and confidence, raising significant questions about the
legitimacy of a mandatory system that does not represent all investors.
The Part ends with a discussion of recent industry sentiment supporting
greater inclusion and the need to assess whether public statements are

32. See infra text accompanying notes 33 and 34 (describing information contained in FINRA
arbitration awards).
33. FINRA, RULE 12904(h) (2018) (“All awards shall be made publicly available.”); Arbitration
Awards Online, supra note 31.
34. FINRA, RULE 12904(e)(9) (2018) (“The award shall contain . . . [t]he names of the
arbitrators.”).
35. See Final Interagency Policy Statement Establishing Joint Standards for Assessing the Diversity
Policies and Practice of Entities Regulated by the Agencies, 80 Fed. Reg. 33,016, 33,018 (June 10,
2015) (inclusion is “a process to create and maintain a positive work environment that values
individual similarities and differences, so that all can reach their potential and maximize their
contributions to an organization”); Maria R. Volpe & Sheila M. Sproule, The ADR Inclusion Network:
Addressing Diversity Collectively, ALTS. TO HIGH COST LITIG. (Int’l Inst. for Conflict Prevention
& Resol., New York, NY), June 2019, at 81, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/596f7177f5e231
61e2ee5cf8/t/5d75ce2b61770c1847fa9125/1568001579976/alt_37_6.pdf [https://perma.cc/87TC3PM9] (“Inclusion is a more comprehensive term than diversity. It refers to not only paying attention
to the representation of individuals from diverse backgrounds, but creating an inviting, fair, and
respectful environment that will allow diversity efforts to succeed.”).
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reflected in subsequent action, adding additional reasons why FINRA may
be well positioned as a member of the financial industry to supplement
diversity and inclusion measures in its arbitration forum. Part III examines
the FINRA arbitrator pool and selection process and identifies structural
barriers preventing the inclusion of newer arbitrator entrants in the pool
for smaller claims. These barriers are examined because they may
undermine FINRA’s goal of ensuring diverse arbitrator options for a
subset of disputes in which consumer trust is most necessary to foster
confidence in the securities markets—smaller claims. Part IV details the
results of an empirical study designed to evaluate the impact of the newly
identified structural barriers to inclusion. It concludes that despite
limitations with the available public data, new arbitrator entrants are a
small proportion of the arbitrators hearing smaller customer claims in the
FINRA forum and that public customers are not obtaining the benefit of
FINRA’s recent arbitrator pool diversification efforts. The Article
concludes with a discussion of recommendations, including providing
greater transparency to more fully assess an arbitral forum’s inclusivity
and eliminating known barriers that make it difficult for new entrants to
serve as arbitrators. Though FINRA’s accountability to the public and
SEC oversight may more readily lead to changes in its mandatory
arbitration forum, the lessons learned from studying the increased
transparency of the FINRA forum can inform interventions necessary to
ensure diversity and inclusion in other arbitration forums.
I.

ARBITRATION OF CONSUMER SECURITIES CLAIMS

Research indicates that many investors lack the knowledge and skills
to invest on their own.36 It is perhaps then no surprise that many investors
seek assistance from others,37 including stockbrokers or brokerage firms,
36. See, e.g., JILL E. FISCH, ANDREA HASLER, ANNAMARIA LUSARDI & GARY MOTTOLA, NEW
EVIDENCE ON THE FINANCIAL KNOWLEDGE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF INVESTORS 1 (2019),
https://www.usfinancialcapability.org/downloads/FINRA_GFLEC_Investor_Knowledge_Report.
pdf [https://perma.cc/2CTZ-WRKS] (“[I]ndividuals are not well equipped to manage their personal
finances, in particular, their financial investments.”).
37. Investors may obtain advice from a range of professionals who, if they are subject to regulation,
are regulated in a fragmented fashion under different standards notwithstanding the fact that most
consumer investors are unaware of the differences between each category of professional. See
generally Christine Lazaro & Benjamin P. Edwards, The Fragmented Regulation of Investment
Advice: A Call for Harmonization, 4 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 47 (2014) (describing
differences in regulation between providers of investment advice); Arthur B. Laby, Fiduciary
Obligations of Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers, 55 VILL. L. REV. 701 (2010) (describing
differences between fiduciary standards of broker-dealers and investment advisers). See also Barbara
Black, How to Improve Retail Investor Protection After the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 59, 60 (2010) (“[B]roker-dealers and investment
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to assist them with their investment choices.38 So, whether these investors
are day traders who invested in GameStop and have a trading dispute with
Robinhood or a retiree who received questionable advice from a
stockbroker, they are most likely required to adjudicate their claims in the
FINRA forum.39 Many Americans have neither heard of securities
arbitration nor know that if they have a brokerage agreement, they are
most likely required to submit to arbitration if a dispute arises.40 This is a
significant concern, given that approximately one-third of Americans
maintain investment accounts outside their retirement plans, and if they
work with a stockbroker to manage any of their investments, they are
bound to arbitrate.41 The 2018 National Financial Capability Study
Investor Survey found that 61% of investors rely on professionals to
choose investments for them at least sometimes.42 Sixty-five percent of

advisers are subject to different regulatory schemes and standards of conduct, which cause investor
confusion and concern about the adequacy of retail investor protection.”).
38. JUDY T. LIN, CHRISTOPHER BUMCROT, GARY MOTTOLA & GERRI WALSH, FINRA INV. EDUC.
FOUND., INVESTORS IN THE UNITED STATES: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL FINANCIAL CAPABILITY
STUDY 8 (2019), https://www.usfinancialcapability.org/downloads/NFCS_2018_Inv_Survey_Full_
Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/PEZ3-YE44].
39. Chris Dolmetsch & Christopher Yasiejko, Robinhood Suits Come Daily, but an Outcome May
Be Years Away, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 29, 2021, 1:20 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2021-01-29/robinhood-suits-arrive-daily-but-an-outcome-may-be-years-away [https://perma.cc/TH
C4-CW8G].
40. Jill I. Gross & Barbara Black, When Perception Changes Reality: An Empirical Study of
Investors’ Views of the Fairness of Securities Arbitration, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 349, 364 (“63.29%
of survey participants who answered this question and identified themselves as customers (629
responses) were aware that the customer agreement contained a PDAA before the dispute arose;
36.71% of customers were not aware.”). Many laypersons are not familiar with arbitration at all. See
Kristin M. Blankley, Ashley M. Votruba, Logen M. Bartz & Lisa M. PytlikZillig, ADR Is Not a
Household Term: Considering the Ethical and Practical Consequences of the Public’s Lack of
Understanding of Mediation and Arbitration, 99 NEB. L. REV. 797, 816 (2021) (finding 20.1% of
surveyed community members had “no familiarity with arbitration”).
41. LIN ET AL., supra note 38, at 3 (“Just under a third (32%) of the national population have
investments in non-retirement accounts. This percentage has changed little from 30% in 2015.”);
GARY MOTTOLA, FINRA INV. EDUC. FOUND., INSIGHTS: FINANCIAL CAPABILITY: A SNAPSHOT OF
INVESTOR HOUSEHOLDS IN AMERICA 1 (2015), https://www.finrafoundation.org/sites/finrafoundati
on/files/A-Snapshot-of-Investor-Households-in-America_0_0_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/YR28UVCR] (“Approximately 6 in 10 households in the United States own securities investments—
typically through taxable accounts, IRAs or employer-sponsored retirement plans. However, this
figure drops to a little over 3 in 10 if only taxable investments are considered.”). Investors whose
accounts are managed by fiduciary-level investment advisers governed by the Investment Company
Act of 1940 are not generally subject to mandatory FINRA arbitration. See generally Lazaro &
Edwards, supra note 37 (describing divergent regulatory schemes applicable to stockbrokers,
investment advisers, and insurance providers); Guidance on Disputes Between Investors and
Investment Advisers That Are Not FINRA Members, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/arbitrationmediation/guidance-disputes-between-investors-and-investment-advisers-are-not-finra-members
[https://perma.cc/U7SD-JJYQ].
42. LIN ET AL., supra note 38, at 8.
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surveyed investors will also discuss investment options with a
professional before investing on their own.43 When broken down by
gender, 64% of women, versus 58% of men, defer to professionals to
make investment choices for them.44 Most non-retirement investors are
white, making up 73% of American households holding taxable
investment accounts.45 The 27% non-white holders of taxable investment
accounts comprise 11% Hispanic investors, 8% Black investors, 7%
Asian investors, and 1% Native American investors.46 The disparity in
taxable account ownership by race and ethnicity drops after adjustment
for income and education.47 Simply put, people of color are underrepresented as members of the investing public.
Should the median non-retirement account investor have a dispute with
a stockbroker,48 that claim would most likely be subject to FINRA’s
smaller claim arbitration process, known as Simplified Arbitration.49 The
median non-retirement account balance is $6,200.50 The mean American
account balance is $4,500.51 Surveys repeatedly find, however, that over
43. Id.; see also id. at 9 (“[A]mong respondents who at least sometimes let a professional choose
their investments, nearly three-quarters (72%) also decide based on their own research at least
sometimes.”).
44. Id. at 9.
45. MOTTOLA, supra note 41, at 2 (“And 73 percent of respondents from households that own
taxable investments are white, compared to 67 percent for households with only retirement accounts,
and 61 percent for households without accounts.”).
46. Id. at 3.
47. Id. at 9 (“[T]he 14 percentage point difference between white and [B]lack households in terms
of taxable account ownership noted above drops in half to 7 percentage points after controlling for
key demographic variables such as income and education. And the 11 percentage-point difference
between white and Hispanic households drops to 4 percentage points.”).
48. See CONSTANTIJN W.A. PANIS & MICHAEL J. BRIEN, BROKERAGE ACCOUNTS IN THE UNITED
STATES, at i (2015), https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/researchers/analysis/retirement/br
okerage-accounts-in-the-us.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Z3S-QYDX] (finding that 27% of American
households with a brokerage account relied upon a broker’s advice, with a median non-retirement
investment account balance of $6,200).
49. See FINRA, RULE 12800 (2018) (“This rule applies to arbitrations involving $50,000 or
less . . . .”). Simplified Arbitration rules provide consumers a default procedure under which the case
is decided with no hearing, id., which typically moves much more quickly. Investors can also elect
between two hearing options—a special proceeding via telephone with abbreviated timeframes and
means for presenting evidence or a regular hearing, id. See also infra Part III (describing different
proceeding types).
50. PANIS & BRIEN, supra note 48, at i; see also Nicole G. Iannarone, Computer as Confidant:
Digital Investment Advice and the Fiduciary Standard, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 141, 148 (2018)
(describing need to service accounts deemed small by financial professionals).
51. Jesse Bricker, Lisa J. Dettling, Alice Henriques, Joanne W. Hsu, Lindsay Jacobs, Kevin B.
Moore, Sarah Pack, John Sabelhaus, Jeffrey Thompson & Richard A. Windle, Changes in U.S. Family
Finances from 2013 to 2016: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, FED. RSRV. BULL.
(Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Washington, D.C.) Sept. 2017, at 1, 19,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/scf17.pdf [https://perma.cc/F99T-L5EV].
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40% of average Americans would struggle to pay an unexpected expense
of $400.52 Accordingly, if the average American had a dispute with their
stockbroker or brokerage firm, a claim that falls under Simplified
Arbitration rules would be significantly important to them.
Underpinning the initial development of securities arbitration through
its subsequent evolution to a uniform, mandatory process is the key
principle that if consumers did not believe they could fairly and efficiently
resolve their disputes, they would not trust the securities markets.
Arbitration was a feature of the securities industry as early as the 1790s,
nearly as soon as the industry began in the United States.53 At that time,
arbitration was a necessity: it filled a gap for those securities contracts that
were not enforceable at law and gave customers the ability to trust that
when they purchased a security contract from an exchange member, they
would have the ability to obtain redress should a problem subsequently
arise.54 As will be described in this section, the move from voluntary to
mandatory took many years, with active engagement of the industry,
regulators, judicial, and public participants.55 The modern progression to
mandatory arbitration under uniform provisions under the SEC’s
oversight began with a focused look at the plight of regular investors—
those with the smallest claims—and the protections built therein formed
the bases for modern securities arbitration of all claim sizes.56 At the same
time, this progression was largely spearheaded by the securities industry,
which may illustrate capture of the dispute resolution mechanism due to

52. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF U.S.
HOUSEHOLDS IN 2018 (2019), https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/2019-economic-wellbeing-of-us-households-in-2018-dealing-with-unexpected-expenses.htm
[https://perma.cc/2P2QK2R9]; Ann Carrns, Even in Strong Economy, Most Families Don’t Have Enough Emergency
Savings, N.Y. TIMES: YOUR MONEY (Oct. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/25/yourmoney/emergency-savings.html [https://perma.cc/K74X-EYLY] (“The Pew Charitable Trusts found
in 2015 that many families lacked funds to cover a $2,000 expense. And the Federal Reserve has
repeatedly found that a significant share of households would struggle to cope with an unexpected
$400 expense, although it reported in May that the percentage of households able to handle
unexpected expenses had ‘improved markedly’ . . . .”).
53. Jill I. Gross, The Historical Basis of Securities Arbitration as an Investor Protection
Mechanism, 2016 J. DISP. RESOL. 171, 175–76 [hereinafter Gross, Historical Basis] (tracing history
of arbitration of industry securities disputes in the United States beginning in late 1790s).
54. Id.; see also STUART BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES REGULATION: CULTURAL AND
POLITICAL ROOTS, 1690–1860, at 250 (1998).
55. Gross, Historical Basis, supra note 53, at 180–82.
56. Id. (describing investor protection and trust creation goals of arbitration in securities realm);
Jill I. Gross, AT&T Mobility and the Future of Small Claims Arbitration, 42 S.W. L. REV. 47, 63–64
(2012) (describing origins of small claims arbitration); Alexander & Iannarone, supra note 25, at
1708–12 (describing progression of securities arbitration from voluntary to mandatory and investor
protection origins); infra notes 68–70 and accompanying text (describing development of small
claims arbitration).
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the securities industry’s involvement in the design process which led a
mechanism designed for investor protection to favor industry players.57
As will be shown, the recognition that legitimacy is necessary for public
support of securities markets and arbitration, as well as regulatory
oversight of securities arbitration, position FINRA as a case study where
deficiencies in the arbitral system may more likely be altered.
Early in the twentieth century, several important actors supported
arbitration. Self-regulated organizations (SROs) like the securities
exchanges58 adopted arbitration as a dispute resolution device relating to
securities and allowed investors to invoke arbitration.59 Congress
illustrated its support of arbitration via passage of the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA).60 The newly created Securities & Exchange Commission
(SEC) encouraged arbitration.61 Despite this support, courts were
skeptical of arbitration.62 Arbitration involving federal securities claims
was particularly suspect and scrutinized: courts erected judicial barriers to
mandatory arbitration of securities claims such that few investor claims
were actually arbitrated despite SRO willingness to hear the claims.63 In
1953, the United States Supreme Court spoke definitively when it

57. See, e.g., Benjamin P. Edwards, The Dark Side of Self-Regulation, 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 573, 606–
07 (2017) [hereinafter Edwards, The Dark Side of Self-Regulation] (“[Regulatory capture] generally
‘denotes the misalignment of incentives of government actors who pursue narrow private interests
that may conflict with the public interest they purport to serve.’” (quoting Saule T. Omarova, Bankers,
Bureaucrats, and Guardians: Toward Tripartism in Financial Services Regulation, 37 J. CORP. L.
621, 629 (2012))); id. at 585 (“FINRA also maintains control over industry regulation and the extent
of investor protection available by channeling customer disputes through its arbitration forum.”).
58. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(26) (“The term ‘self-regulatory organization’ means any national
securities exchange, registered securities association, or registered clearing agency . . . .”). For a brief
history of the formation of self-regulatory organizations in the financial industry, see Edwards, The
Dark Side of Self-Regulation, supra note 57, at 578–82.
59. Gross, Historical Basis, supra note 53, at 175–76.
60. Federal Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1947) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. § 2)
(recognizing the validity, irrevocability, and enforcement of arbitration agreements).
61. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Opinion Letter, Release No. 34-131 (Mar. 21, 1935), as reprinted
in Westlaw, 1935 WL 29028 (suggesting that the SEC “encourage its members to offer customers a
standard arbitration agreement requiring that resort be had to arbitration at the election of either the
customer or the member, and providing for arbitration before independent arbitral tribunals at the
election of the customer”).
62. Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in
Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2861–65 (2015); Robert S. Clemente, Trends
in Securities Industry Arbitration: A View of the Past, the Present, and the Future: “The Dream, the
Nightmare, and the Reality”, N.Y. ST. BAR J., Sept.–Oct. 1996, at 18 (“In spite of this [judicial]
hostility, securities industry arbitration continued throughout its nearly 200-year history to be
recognized as a viable alternative method of resolving securities industry disputes.” (emphasis
omitted)).
63. Gross, Historical Basis, supra note 53, at 181.
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addressed the arbitrability of securities claims in Wilko v. Swan64 and
refused to enforce a pre-dispute arbitration agreement (PDAA) in a
contract between a consumer investor and stockbroker.65 For several
subsequent decades, consumer investors with Securities Act claims thus
had two choices: if a PDAA existed in their brokerage agreement, they
could either voluntarily proceed in arbitration or file a federal claim in
federal court notwithstanding the PDAA.66 Nevertheless, the SROs
continued to embrace arbitration as a viable means for resolving customer
claims and offered it as a voluntary mechanism for investors to resolve
disputes with their brokers, with most SROs developing their own arbitral
forums.67
The small claims securities dispute resolution system shaped and
formed the foundation of the now ubiquitous and mandatory securities
arbitration system. In the mid-1970s, the SEC gained more authority over
SROs and, accordingly, their arbitration procedures.68 Among the ways
the SEC exercised this authority was guiding SROs towards a uniform
procedure for resolving customer disputes involving smaller sums.69 The
SEC believed a set of uniform small claims arbitration procedures was
essential for ensuring overall investor trust in the securities markets
because it would “contribute significantly to the protection of investors
(which is the objective of the federal securities laws),” increase consumer
investor participation in the markets, and support the SROs’ commitment

64. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
65. Id.
66. Gross, Historical Basis, supra note 53, at 181. Pure state law claims were subject to arbitration.
Subsequently, mixed state and federal securities claims arising from the same transaction presented
issues as to where they would be heard and whether a federal claim or arbitration would advance first
or if they would proceed concurrently. See generally Constantine N. Katsoris, The Arbitration of a
Public Securities Dispute, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 279 (1984) (describing mixed claims); Joel
Seligman, The Quiet Revolution: Securities Arbitration Confronts the Hard Questions, 33 HOUS. L.
REV. 327, 333–34 (1996) (describing the intertwining doctrine and subsequent decisions related to
arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims arising from a single transaction); B. Judson Hennington, III,
Unravelling the Intertwining Doctrine: Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 37 ALA. L. REV. 457
(1986); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985) (rejecting the intertwining doctrine);
id. at 224–26 (White, J., concurring) (questioning Wilko). Later Supreme Court precedent overruled
Wilko and made this doctrine obsolete. See infra notes 72–75 and accompanying text.
67. Gross, Historical Basis, supra note 53, at 181 (describing adoption of arbitration by AMEX in
1964, the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) in 1968, and the Chicago Board Options
Exchange, Inc. (CBOE) in 1973); Constantine N. Katsoris, Securities Arbitration: A Clinical
Experiment, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 193, 193 (1998) (describing SRO adoption of securities
arbitration for customer disputes pre-1978 and development of uniform arbitration code).
68. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97; see also Edward Brunet,
Toward Changing Models of Securities Arbitration, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1459, 1465 (1996).
69. Settling Disputes Between Customers and Registered Brokers and Dealers, Exchange Act
Release No. 12,528, 9 SEC Docket 833, 834 (June 9, 1976).
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to observing “high standards of commercial honor.”70 The result of this
SEC/industry collaboration—the first uniform securities arbitration code
focusing on the voluntary resolution of smaller claims—was adopted by
the major SROs and approved by the SEC by the end of 1978.71
Within the next decade, this voluntary code would have significantly
more impact. In the late 1980s, the Supreme Court reversed course from
Wilko, issuing rulings in a series of cases that functionally led to nearly
all investors being required to arbitrate disputes with their stockbrokers.72
The securities industry quickly embraced Wilko’s demise: mandatory
arbitration of consumer disputes with stockbrokers soon became the status
quo, and the number of securities arbitration proceedings grew
exponentially.73 After the merger of the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD) and New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) Member
Regulation into a new SRO called the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority (FINRA) in 2007,74 one forum became the host of nearly all
70. Id. at 834; see also Integrated Nationwide System for the Resolution of Investor Disputes,
Exchange Act Release No. 12,974, 10 S.E.C. Docket 955, 955 (Nov. 15, 1976) (stating that, absent
such a system, “individual investors may not have, in every respect, the measure of protection
anticipated by the federal securities laws, including the just and equitable principles of trade which
regulated exchanges and associations are required to enforce”).
71. Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes, Exchange Act Release No. 14737, 1978 WL 196611
(May 4, 1978) (approving New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and American Stock Exchange
(AMEX) proposals); Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes, Exchange Act Release No. 14881,
1978 WL 196225 (June 22, 1978) (approving Pacific Stock Exchange (PSE) and Chicago Board
Options Exchange (CBOE)); Order Approving Proposed Rule Change, Exchange Act Release
No. 14892, 1978 WL 196232 (June 23, 1978) (approving National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD)); Order Approving Proposed Rule Change, Exchange Act Release No. 14896, 1978 WL
196243 (June 26, 1978) (approving Philadelphia Stock Exchange (PHLX)); Order Approving
Amended Proposed Rule Change, Exchange Act Release No. 15390, 16 SEC Docket 425 (Dec. 8,
1978) (approving Midwest Stock Exchange (MSE)). See generally SEC. INDUS. CONF. ON ARB., FIRST
REPORT—REPORT OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION TO THE SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (1977) (describing initial work towards uniform code); id. at Exhibit
A (proposed rules for small claims arbitration); id. at Exhibit D (consumer guide for small claims
arbitration).
72. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); see also Seligman, supra note 66, at 328
(describing decisions from 1985 through 1989 leading to mandatory securities arbitration).
73. See Seligman, supra note 66, at 328–29; Barbara Black, Establishing a Securities Arbitration
Clinic: The Experience at Pace, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 35, 35 (2000). Though it never reached the same
volume as the SRO-sponsored forums, the AAA once had a securities arbitration program.
Constantine N. Katsoris, SICA: The First Twenty Years, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 483, 525 (1996).
74. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to Amend the By-Laws of NASD, Exchange Act
Release No. 56,145, 72 Fed. Reg. 42,169 (July 26, 2007); Nancy Condon & Herb Perone, NASD and
NYSE Member Regulation Combine to Form the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority—FINRA,
FINRA (July 30, 2007), https://www.finra.org/media-center/news-releases/2007/nasd-and-nysemember-regulation-combine-form-financial-industry [https://perma.cc/SQ47-458V] (“FINRA was
created through the consolidation of NASD and the member regulation, enforcement and arbitration
operations of the New York Stock Exchange.”).
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securities disputes: FINRA Dispute Resolution Services.75
Most disputes administered by FINRA come to the forum through a
PDAA in a broker-dealer/customer agreement mandating that any
disputes arising from the relationship be resolved in the FINRA forum.76
FINRA rules provide that the customer may initiate an arbitration if a
customer either does not have a PDAA in a brokerage contract or does not
have a written brokerage contract.77 It is a violation of FINRA rules for
the broker-dealer or associated person to object to the forum.78 This
history and evolution of securities arbitration, and in particular of small
claims arbitration, should inform inquiry into whether the current system
still achieves its investor protection and trust-creation goals while
emphasizing the legitimacy and oversight aspects of FINRA arbitration
that position it as an ideal case study for studying and suggesting
improvements to diversity in arbitrator pools.79
II.

PERCEPTION OF FAIRNESS: LACK OF DIVERSITY IN THE
FINANCIAL INDUSTRY AND MANDATORY ARBITRATION

The perception of fairness has long been a concern in securities
arbitration, an essentially mandatory regime designed to ensure systemic
trust.80 Industries led by homogeneous parties that pit consumers against
sophisticated repeat players raise fairness concerns.81 Those concerns are
75. FINRA
Dispute
Resolution
Services:
Arbitration
&
Mediation,
FINRA,
https://www.finra.org/arbitration-and-mediation [https://perma.cc/98VQ-ZW4S] (“FINRA operates
the largest securities dispute resolution forum in the United States . . . .”); Jill I. Gross, McMahon
Turns Twenty: The Regulation of Fairness in Securities Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 493, 495 n.13
(2008) (“[D]ue to consolidation and the 2007 merger of the regulatory functions of NASD and the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), FINRA is now the only meaningful forum for securities
arbitration, handling more than 95% of the cases.”).
76. Benjamin P. Edwards, Arbitration’s Dark Shadow, 18 NEV. L.J. 427, 430 (2018).
77. FINRA, RULE 12200 (2007).
78. FINRA, RULE IM-12000 (2007) (“It may be deemed conduct inconsistent with just and
equitable principles of trade and a violation of Rule 2010 for a member or a person associated with a
member to: (a) fail to submit a dispute for arbitration under the Code as required by the Code . . . .”).
79. See, e.g., Gross, Historical Basis, supra note 53, at 185 (“FINRA, as well as industry and
investor advocates, should recall and reinforce the historical basis of securities arbitration as a
mechanism to protect investors.”).
80. See, e.g., Constantine N. Katsoris, Securities Arbitrators Do Not Grow on Trees, 14 FORDHAM
J. CORP. & FIN. L. 49, 51 (2008) (“Unless such [securities arbitration] procedures are fair in fact as
well as in appearance, however, their popularity as a means for settling securities disputes will greatly
diminish, especially if the public is limited to applying these procedures to resolve their disputes
before only one self-regulating organization (SRO), FINRA.”).
81. John D. Feerick & Linda Gerstel, The Role of Arbitration Counsel in Ensuring Legitimacy and
Efficiency, N.Y. L.J., May 29, 2019, at 1, 4 (“All arbitration stakeholders have an interest in making
sure that arbitration as a practice is not viewed or used as a tool for those with greater bargaining
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magnified when it appears the forum lacks diversity, has high barriers to
inclusion, or is largely controlled by the industry it purports to regulate.82
Taken together, these critiques raise fundamental questions of fairness if
investors have no choice but to arbitrate any dispute they have against a
stockbroker, undermining the legitimacy of the forum as well as the roles
it plays in investor protection and ensuring confidence in the securities
markets.83 How can an investor expect a fair consideration if it is both true
that the industry controls the dispute resolution system and consumer
investors who are not white males over the age of sixty are unlikely to see
arbitrators with backgrounds like their own?84 Similar critiques can be
made of mandatory arbitration in other consumer contexts.85 As described
below, the financial industry, ADR community, and FINRA, specifically,
are increasingly focused on the equity concerns raised by each of these
critiques, recognizing there is significant room for improvement and
indicating that regulatory oversight and industry support may permit
FINRA to lead other mandatory arbitration forums in diversifying
arbitration rosters.
A.

Diversity in the Financial Industry

Despite proof that diversity benefits the financial industry, the industry
is largely white and male.86 A recent study establishes, for example, that
power because they are repeat players. Wielding unequal power to exact a disproportionate benefit is
unfair and is also likely to result in legal changes that send these claims back to the courts.”).
82. See, e.g., Barr, supra note 4, at 802 (“Generally speaking, the [FINRA] pool of arbitrators has
close ties to the financial industry, lacks diversity, and is infrequently updated.”); Edwards, The Dark
Side of Self-Regulation, supra note 57 (describing capture of FINRA board); Steven Davidoff
Solomon, The Government’s Elite and Regulatory Capture, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (June 11, 2010,
2:00 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/06/11/the-governments-elite-and-regulatory-capture
[https://perma.cc/N2KM-U6QR] (describing capture).
83. Feerick & Gerstel, supra note 81, at 3 (“Recent criticism of arbitration has focused on three
issues: the impartiality and independence of party appointed arbitrators, diversity, and access to
justice.”); Armeen F. Mistry, Lack of Diversity Continues to Hurt Alternative Dispute Resolution,
TROUTMAN PEPPER (May 26, 2020), https://www.troutman.com/insights/lack-of-diversity-continuesto-hurt-alternative-dispute-resolution.html [https://perma.cc/GJ7Z-DRCQ] (“[T]here is also a
credible argument that a homogeneous arbitration panel will be unable to fully understand a diverse
claimant’s concerns. This leads to a loss of faith in the process.”).
84. Feerick & Gerstel, supra note 81, at 3 (“To trust the system, participants must trust that
arbitrators reflect their values.”).
85. See infra section II.B.
86. SUNDIATU DIXON-FYLE, KEVIN DOLAN, VIVIAN HUNT & SARA PRINCE, DIVERSITY WINS:
HOW INCLUSION MATTERS 3 (2020), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/featured%20in
sights/diversity%20and%20inclusion/diversity%20wins%20how%20inclusion%20matters/diversity
-wins-how-inclusion-matters-vf.pdf?shouldIndex=false [https://perma.cc/8XUW-4GZQ] (“[T]here
is a substantial performance differential—48 percent—between the most and least gender-diverse
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“African Americans have been largely excluded from senior leadership
opportunities [in financial regulatory agencies] since the New Deal” and
that there is “a near total exclusion of African Americans from roles as
senior policy staffers in current financial regulatory agencies, regardless
of the political affiliation of the political appointees making hiring and
staffing decisions.”87 Additionally, America’s corporate boards and
executive suites lack diversity, leading to recent rule changes to push
companies to diversify.88
Diversity within the financial industry has been a concern for decades,
companies.”); id. at 4 (“In 2019, fourth-quartile companies for executive-team gender diversity were
19 percent more likely than companies in the other three quartiles to underperform on profitability.”);
MAJORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON FIN. SERVS., 116TH CONG., DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION: HOLDING
AMERICA’S LARGE BANKS ACCOUNTABLE 3 (2020), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/BA13/20
200212/110498/HHRG-116-BA13-20200212-SD003-U1.pdf [https://perma.cc/9622-6J4D] (“Banks
and other financial services firms claim to agree with the underlying premise that diverse, inclusive
organizations can be more profitable and productive. But despite the known benefits, the financial
services industry, including our nation’s banks, remains mostly white and male. This is not only true
of banks’ workforces and executive ranks, but is also true for banks’ boards of directors, suppliers,
and asset managers.”); Kristin Johnson, Steven A. Ramirez & Cary Martin Shelby, Diversifying to
Mitigate Risk: Can Dodd–Frank Section 342 Help Stabilize the Financial Sector?, 73 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1795, 1806–18 (2016) (describing empirical data supporting increased diversity in financial
sector); Matt Krentz, Survey: What Diversity and Inclusion Policies Do Employees Actually Want?,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 5, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/02/survey-what-diversity-and-inclusionpolicies-do-employees-actually-want [https://perma.cc/E5LH-3MBZ] (“[C]orporate diversity still
lags, especially at the top levels, which continue to be dominated by white heterosexual men.”); Sylvia
Ann Hewlett, Melinda Marshall & Laura Sherbin, How Diversity Can Drive Innovation, HARV. BUS.
REV., Dec. 2013, https://hbr.org/2013/12/how-diversity-can-drive-innovation
[https://perma.cc/U5NB-N259] (“[D]iversity unlocks innovation and drives market growth.”);
Richard B. Evans, Melissa Porras Prado, A. Emanuele Rizzo & Rafael Zambrana, Identity, Diversity,
and Team Performance: Evidence from U.S. Mutual Funds (Ctr. for Econ. Pol’y Rsch., Discussion
Paper
No. DP14305,
2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3526029
[https://perma.cc/ZYP4-HP2G] (finding diverse teams outperform homogeneous teams).
87. Chris Brummer, What Do the Data Reveal About (the Absence of Black) Financial Regulators?
3
(Brookings
Inst.,
Working
Paper,
2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2020/09/ES-09.02.20-Brummer.pdf [https://perma.cc/97D2-NXVV].
88. Steven A. Ramirez, A Flaw in the Sarbanes-Oxley Reform: Can Diversity in the Boardroom
Quell Corporate Corruption?, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 837, 838 (2003) (“Today, corporate America is
still largely governed by white males. Of the 11,500 Fortune 1000 board seats, African Americans
hold 388 and Hispanics hold only 86. In other words, these two groups, which together comprise
about 30% of the United States population, hold a combined 4.1% of all Fortune 1000 board seats.
Women hold only 14% of the seats. Worse yet, 90% of all senior executives at Fortune 1000
companies are white males.” (citations omitted)).
The SEC recently approved securities exchange NASDAQ’s proposal to require that companies
listed on the exchange provide aggregate disclosures “on the voluntary self-identified gender and
racial characteristics and LGBTQ+ status” for members on the company’s board of directors and “to
have, or explain why it does not have, at least two members of its board of directors who are Diverse,
including at least one director who self-identifies as female and at least one director who self-identifies
as an Underrepresented Minority or LGBTQ+.” See Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes
Related to Adopt Listing Rules Related to Board Diversity, Exchange Act Release No. 92,590, 86
Fed. Reg. 44,424 (Aug. 6, 2021).
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with social justice organizations and Congress intervening to nudge the
industry towards greater inclusion with little impact.89 Congressional
action following the 2008 financial crisis included provisions on diversity
and inclusion in the financial industry due to the overwhelming impact
the economic downturn had upon communities of color and women.90
Section 342 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank)91 required that federal financial
agencies, including the SEC, each establish an Office of Minority and
Women Inclusion (OMWI).92 These provisions charge the director of each
agency’s OMWI with the responsibility of “assessing the diversity
policies and practices of entities regulated by the agency.”93 Professors
Johnson, Ramirez, and Shelby argue that in enacting section 342,
Congress viewed diversity and inclusion as a remedy to the financial crisis
and “one mechanism to achieve superior risk management in the financial
sector.”94
A coalition of financial industry agencies, including the SEC,
implemented section 342 via a joint statement.95 Because the SEC
regulates FINRA, the SEC’s OMWI assesses FINRA under section 342.96
The agencies’ implementation of section 342 was designed to encourage
transparency and voluntary self-assessment so that best practices in the

89. See, e.g., Sandra D. Grannum, Why Does Racial Equality, Diversity and Inclusion Continue to
Elude Wall Street?, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 2020, at 165, 165–70 (2020) (describing diversity
measures from 1997 Rainbow PUSH Wall Street Project through Dodd-Frank).
90. Anthony M. Sharett, Dodd-Frank Section 342: An Analysis of an Emerging Regulation
Impacting the Financial Services Industry, A.B.A: BUS. L. TODAY (Sept. 16, 2015),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2015/09/03_sharett/ (last visited
Nov. 29, 2021) (“Statistics demonstrate that communities of color, some of which were targeted by
predatory practices, were disproportionally impacted both as consumers and employees of financial
services companies. Likewise, large institutions’ efforts to utilize women-owned and minority-owned
businesses decreased significantly during the economic downturn. The impact from the financial
crisis has been long-lasting for diverse populations and many believe that concerted efforts to promote
diversity ideals have been severely undermined.”).
91. Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 342, 124 Stat. 1376, 1541–45 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5452).
92. Id. § 342(a)(1).
93. Id. § 342(b)(2)(C).
94. Johnson et al., supra note 86, at 1803.
95. Joint Standards for Assessing the Diversity Policies and Practices of Entities Regulated by the
Agencies, Exchange Act Release No. 75,050, 80 Fed. Reg. 33,016 (May 22, 2015).
96. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STANDARDS FOR ASSESSING THE DIVERSITY POLICIES AND
PRACTICES OF ENTITIES REGULATED BY THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION:
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 2 (2018) [hereinafter SEC, FAQ], https://www.sec.gov/files/DARFAQ.pdf [https://perma.cc/S635-2YHF] (“Entities regulated by the SEC include . . . [s]elf-regulatory
organizations.”).
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diversity and inclusion space would enter the financial sphere.97 Thus, the
SEC’s OMWI sends a form Diversity Assessment Report98 to regulated
entities with more than 100 employees no more than once every two years
seeking voluntary responses and offering flexibility by permitting
regulated entities to “conduct self-assessments in any manner that works
best based upon their unique characteristics.”99 Regulated entities who
respond need not worry about disclosure of their individual information:
the SEC “[w]ill not identify a particular entity or disclose confidential
business information.”100 The SEC OMWI notes that the Joint Standards
contemplate that the regulated entity “conduct a self-assessment of its
diversity policies and practices at least annually.”101
Perhaps unsurprisingly given how the agencies implemented
section 342, SEC regulated entity response rates to the SEC OMWI’s
assessment surveys have been low. The SEC OMWI requested 1,500
regulated entities voluntarily complete the Diversity Assessment Report
(or submit their own self-assessment) in 2018.102 Only thirty-eight
responses were received, covering 5% of SEC regulated entities invited to
respond.103 SEC OMWI noted in its FY2019 report to Congress that the
“number of individual diversity self-assessments received from SECregulated entities during the first year was lower than expected.”104
97. Joint Standards for Assessing the Diversity Policies and Practices of Entities Regulated by the
Agencies, Exchange Act Release No. 75,050, 80 Fed. Reg. at 33,024 (“The Agencies interpret the
term ‘assessment’ to mean self-assessment. Entities that have successful diversity policies and
practices allocate time and resources to monitoring and evaluating performance under their diversity
policies and practices on an ongoing basis. Entities are encouraged to disclose their diversity policies
and practices, as well as information related to their assessments, to the Agencies and the public.”).
98. The form is available online via the SEC’s Office of Minority & Women Inclusion. OFF. OF
MINORITY & WOMEN INCLUSION, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, HOW TO COMPLETE AND SUBMIT THE
DIVERSITY
ASSESSMENT
REPORT
FOR
ENTITIES
REGULATED
BY
THE
SEC,
https://www.sec.gov/files/OMWI-DAR-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/ALD8-3HP2].
99. SEC, FAQ, supra note 96, at 4. Accordingly, regulated entities have wide latitude in
determining what type of information to submit and how to submit it. Id.
100. OFF. OF MINORITY & WOMEN INCLUSION, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DIVERSITY
ASSESSMENT
REPORT
FOR
ENTITIES
REGULATED
BY
THE
SEC
(2020),
https://www.sec.gov/files/DAR_Webinar_March_2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/H6YG-86LC].
101. SEC, FAQ, supra note 96, at 4. Regulated entities are not required to submit diversity
assessment information at all and are only requested to submit to the SEC at most every two years.
Id.
102. OFF. OF MINORITY & WOMEN INCLUSION, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DIVERSITY
ASSESSMENT REPORT FOR ENTITIES REGULATED BY THE SEC: SUMMARY OF YEAR ONE RESULTS 1
(2018), https://www.sec.gov/files/SEC_Diversity_Assessment_Report_Year_One_Summary%20Re
port.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VBR-U2WM].
103. Id.
104. OFF. OF MINORITY & WOMEN INCLUSION, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS
36
(2020), https://www.sec.gov/files/OMWI_Annual_Report_FY2019_508.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JB4L-Y9M5].
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Whether section 342 will push SEC-regulated entities towards greater
transparency and best practices remains to be seen,105 but the need for
greater diversity and inclusion within the financial sector remains critical,
and support for it may prompt FINRA to voluntarily make changes to its
mandatory forum. As greater numbers of investors, including more
women and people of color, enter the securities market in a post-Covid
world, ensuring that their backgrounds and experiences are reflected in
the securities arbitration pool remains critical for ensuring trust in the
system.106
B.

Arbitrator Diversity in ADR and FINRA’s Dispute Resolution Pool

Even if section 342’s assessment mandate does not require FINRA to
assess diversity and inclusion in its mandatory securities arbitration
system, diversity and inclusion are necessary to legitimize a mandatory
system created to foster trust from the investing public and should prompt
analysis of diversification efforts.107 This is especially so where one
side—the respondent industry member—appears in the forum on a regular
basis108 and appears to regulate itself as a member of the very entity that

105. Though outside the scope of this article, the SEC may wish to nudge FINRA towards greater
diversity and inclusion through section 342 inquiries about FINRA’s arbitrator pool composition.
106. MARK LUSH, ANGELA FONTES, MEIMEIZI ZHU, OLIVIA VALDES & GARY MOTTOLA, FINRA
FOUND. & NORC, INVESTING 2020: NEW ACCOUNTS AND THE PEOPLE WHO OPENED THEM 1 (2021),
https://www.finrafoundation.org/sites/finrafoundation/files/investing-2020-new-accounts-and-thepeople-who-opened-them_1_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DY5-AVUQ] (noting that during COVID-19
pandemic, there was “a surge in retail investors who entered the markets using taxable, non-retirement
investment accounts via online brokers”); id. at 2 (“New Investors were younger, had lower incomes,
and were more racially diverse than Experienced Entrants and Holdover Account Owners.”);
CHARLES SCHWAB CORP., THE RISE OF THE INVESTOR GENERATION (2021),
https://www.aboutschwab.com/generation-investor-study-2021 [https://perma.cc/XM4R-9XMM]
(“15 percent of all current U.S. stock market investors say they first began investing in 2020 . . . .”).
107. David H. Burt & Laura A. Kaster, Why Bringing Diversity to ADR Is a Necessity, ACC
DOCKET, Oct. 2013, at 41, https://www.cpradr.org/news-publications/articles/2013-09-30-whybringing-diversity-to-adr-is-a-necessity-acc/_res/id=Attachments/index=0/Why-Bringing-DiversityD-Burt.pdf [https://perma.cc/VL65-YR56] (“The lack of diversity in the demographics of the neutrals
selected in alternative dispute resolution (ADR) proceedings is a serious issue. . . . [I]t becomes an
issue of fairness that the decisionmakers or facilitators should be representative of the individuals,
institutions and communities that come before them.”); Volpe & Sproule, supra note 35, at 92
(“Moreso [sic] than other contexts, it is particularly important for dispute resolution practitioners to
pay attention to diversity . . . .”).
108. See Volpe & Sproule, supra note 35, at 92 (“The emphasis on choosing interveners who are
known to users or their representatives led to the selection of handpicked providers, even when the
roster lists may be diverse. As a result, it is understandable that there has been a lingering obliqueness
about who serves as a dispute resolver in a field that relies on relationships and addresses complex
psychological factors like unconscious bias. This is compounded by processes that are virtually
unknown to users and others who have little or no knowledge about them.”).
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manages the forum.109 FINRA’s Dispute Resolution forum should ensure
a diverse arbitrator pool and inclusion of underrepresented arbitrators for
two distinct, but related, reasons: (1) representation of the investing public
is necessary for legitimacy110 and (2) overall decision-making improves
when diverse perspectives are included.111
First, the legitimacy of the FINRA forum requires ensuring that all
consumer investor voices are represented in the forum at the arbitrator
level.112 The importance of representation within juries has long been
understood—absent a jury of one’s peers, litigants rightly question the
legitimacy of the decision rendered.113 Similarly, scholars recognize the
important role that increased diversity in the judiciary plays in ensuring
the legitimacy of the judicial system.114 FINRA proceedings are decided
by an arbitrator, a design decision that places the decisionmaker
somewhere between a judge and a jury.115 This intentional design decision
offers benefits by drawing from a wider pool of experiences and

109. See, e.g., section II.A (discussing critiques of arbitration forum administered by organizations
that regulate their own conduct).
110. Cole, Arbitrator Diversity, supra note 1, 972–73 (“[T]he lack of diversity in the arbitrator
corps unquestionably adds to the perception of arbitration as an unfair and unbalanced process that is
geared against ‘the little guy,’ particularly when that ‘little guy’ is a woman and/or a member of a
minority group. Addressing diversity concerns may help convince disputants that an arbitral forum is
a fair and neutral setting where justice is done and is seen to be done.” (emphasis in original)).
111. Burt & Kaster, supra note 107, at 42.
112. See, e.g., Mistry, supra note 83 (“[T]here is consensus that in a deliberative process like ADR,
practitioners should reflect their claimants’ demographics. Unlike traditional litigation, claimants in
ADR have an opportunity to choose their panel, and they may wish (for very good reasons) to choose
arbitrators who are similar to themselves and have had similar experiences.”); id. (“[C]lients need to
trust the neutral third party conducting the process, and claimants are more likely to trust an arbitration
panel that reflects their identity.”).
113. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986) (“The harm from discriminatory jury
selection extends beyond that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to touch the entire
community. Selection procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from juries undermine
public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice.”).
114. See, e.g., Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Public
Confidence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 405, 405 (2000) (“The lack of racial diversity on our nation’s
courts threatens both the quality and legitimacy of judicial decision-making.”); Linda Maria Wayner,
The Affirmatively Hispanic Judge: Modern Opportunities for Increasing Hispanic Representation on
the Federal Bench, 16 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 535, 547 (2010) (“[T]he mere appearance of
excluding Hispanics from the bar perpetuates a latent distrust of legal institutions in general.”); Jason
Iuliano & Avery Stewart, The New Diversity Crisis in the Federal Judiciary, 84 TENN. L. REV. 247,
248–49 (2016) (describing “legitimizing function” of racial and ethnic diversity in federal judiciary).
See generally Vera Shikhelman, Diversity and Decision-Making in International Judicial Institutions:
The United Nations Human Rights Committee as a Case Study, 36 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 60 (2018)
(describing importance of diversity for legitimacy in international context).
115. Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & A.C. Pritchard, The Influence of Arbitrator Background and
Representation on Arbitration Outcomes, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 43, 60 (2014) (“We also note that the
decision makers in the FINRA system function as a type of hybrid between a judge and a jury.”).
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backgrounds than the judiciary currently reflects while requiring training
of all arbitrators—including those without prior legal experience.116
Indeed, this design feature provides FINRA with an advantage in creating
a more inclusive and better-trained arbitrator pool than either a jury or the
bench can currently provide.117 As Professor Sarah Rudolph Cole argues,
diversity and inclusion are necessary to ensure public trust and confidence
that mandatory arbitration is a fair dispute resolution mechanism.118
Accordingly, unless FINRA ensures that all arbitrators in the pool are
included, its dispute resolution system is not a basis from which the
investing public can derive trust in the securities markets because a nondiverse arbitral pool undermines the legitimacy of the forum.
Second, the inclusion of more diverse arbitrators in the FINRA
arbitrator pool will lead to better decision-making overall. Unlike
arbitration forums where parties agree upon an arbitrator, arbitrators in
FINRA proceedings in some instances must have prior experience in the
forum: to serve as an arbitrator on a smaller case, an arbitrator must first
serve on multiple three-arbitrator panels.119 Studies show that diversity of
experience and background leads to better decision-making.120 Thus,
three-arbitrator panels that include diverse voices will benefit the forum
in multiple ways. Most immediately, the parties to the disputes heard by
a diverse three-arbitrator panel will receive the benefit of better decisionmaking in their own cases because the three arbitrators will be working
together to render a decision.121 Subsequently, the experiences gained by
all three arbitrators in such cases will benefit parties in later cases as the
116. FINRA’s arbitrator qualifications and selection process was intentionally designed to consider
the unsettled debate between party representatives in securities representation: whether the
decisionmaker should more resemble a judge or a jury member. See infra section III.A. Thus, FINRA
arbitrators come from a wide range of backgrounds and only half are lawyers. See infra note 191.
This diversity of experience and background thus sets FINRA arbitration apart from the federal
judiciary which has been criticized for a lack of deep diversity—different educational, socioeconomic, and experiential backgrounds. See, e.g., Iuliano & Stewart, supra note 114, at 251
(“Drawing from 225 years of data on the educational backgrounds of federal judges, we find that
today—more than any other point in history—a small number of law schools dominate the federal
judiciary. This is true for both federal judges and their law clerks. Ultimately, we argue that these
educational trends provide evidence of declining deep-level diversity in the federal judiciary.”).
117. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
118. Cole, Arbitrator Diversity, supra note 1, at 969–70.
119. See infra section III.B (describing arbitrator panel composition for smaller and larger claims
and experiential requirements for service as chair).
120. Burt & Kaster, supra note 107, at 42 (“[D]ifferences in approach and points of view improve
group decisions more than the capacity of the individuals who contribute to those decisions because
of the ability to bring in different perspectives, interpretations, problem-solving approaches and
decision models.” (citing SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF DIVERSITY
CREATES BETTER GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES (2008))).
121. See id.
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decision makers mature in their role. More overall decision makers will
benefit claimants without experience in the forum.122 Finally, investors
with smaller claims overseen by a single arbitrator will also benefit
whether their case is heard by a newer or more experienced arbitrator.
Newer arbitrators, whether a member of an under-represented group
themselves or not, will become qualified to hear smaller claims where
they are the sole arbitrator after having benefitted from the wisdom and
knowledge of prior panels, likely bringing what they have learned in those
proceedings to proceedings they decide on their own.123 Experienced
arbitrators will also benefit from the inclusion of diverse perspectives on
panels, providing them with deeper knowledge and experience to bring to
smaller claims they preside over as the sole neutral. The investing public
benefits from the more experienced decision-making skills of arbitrators
who gain experience in a more diverse arbitrator pool on two levels. First,
investors who subsequently bring a claim are more likely to have that
claim heard by an arbitrator with a deeper pool of experience. Second,
investors who turn to publicly available awards to evaluate the merits of
a potential claim or whether to hire a particular stockbroker are able to
access a more robust set of awards to guide them.124
Despite recognizing the importance of inclusion, achieving diversity
and including diverse panelists has been difficult within the overall
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) community and at FINRA.125
Inclusion in the ADR field has been slowed by identified barriers
including the processes by which neutrals are added to a roster and the
means by which forums or parties select neutrals from a roster to hear a
specific proceeding.126 Panel members who have participated in more

122. See Mistry, supra note 83 (“Increasing the pool of arbitrators may provide greater choice for
claimants, encourage better performance among ADR practitioners, and reduce the likelihood of
repeat appointments that may disadvantage inexperienced claimants.”).
123. See FINRA, RULE 12401 (2012) (number of arbitrators); id. 12400(c) (2020) (qualification
for chairperson roster).
124. See Iannarone, Finding Light, supra note 13, at 3 (describing use of awards database to
investigate potential claims).
125. See generally Maria R. Volpe, Measuring Diversity in the ADR Field: Some Observations and
Challenges Regarding Transparency, Metrics and Empirical Research, 19 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J.
201, 205 (2019) (describing importance of diversity in dispute resolution).
A recent study of the roster of the National Academy of Arbitrators, whose members are chosen to
preside over arbitrable disputes involving labor and employment issues, found a striking
underrepresentation of persons of color. See Homer C. La Rue & Alan A. Symonette, The Ray
Corollary Initiative: How to Achieve Diversity and Inclusion in Arbitrator Selection, 63 HOW. L.J.
215, 221 (2020) (“We have determined that as of January 25, 2019, the Academy had accepted 1484
members over its 72 years; approximately 35 persons or 2.35% of that group were persons of color.
Half of those persons of color have been admitted within the last 25 years.”).
126. See Volpe & Sproule, supra note 35, at 81, 92–93.
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proceedings tend to be favored over those without a record, making it
difficult for forums that recruit new, diverse arbitrators to ensure that
recent entrants preside over or mediate disputes.127
To address these concerns, lawyers have called for greater diversity in
alternative dispute resolution.128 Scholars have called for the collection
and study of existing public data as well as increased transparency from
ADR forums so they can better assess inclusion.129 ADR forums—
including AAA, JAMS, and FINRA—are increasingly releasing
aggregate survey information on the demographics of their neutral
rosters.130 The data in the aggregate paint a stark picture. For example,
AAA’s recent demographic data show that over 78% of responding
arbitrators are male and 88% are white.131 Black arbitrators make up 3.9%

127. Id. at 93 (“[D]ispute resolution organizations express difficulty in ensuring a diverse pool of
dispute practitioners. These organizations also operate with their own criteria for placing practitioners
on their rosters that creates another set of constraints and challenges, which makes it more difficult to
ensure that the diverse practitioners on the roster will get chosen over the known practitioners who
are called upon more frequently.”).
128. See SECTION OF DISP. RESOL. REP. TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, AM. BAR ASS’N,
RESOLUTION
105,
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/abanews/2018-AMResolutions/105.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2021) (“RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association
urges providers of domestic and international dispute resolution to expand their rosters with
minorities, women, persons with disabilities, and persons of differing sexual orientations and gender
identities (‘diverse neutrals’) and to encourage the selection of diverse neutrals . . . .”). The report
accompanying Resolution 105 concluded that “the available data show that diversity within Dispute
Resolution significantly lags the legal profession as a whole.” Id. at 2.
129. Volpe, supra note 125, at 206 (“Research is needed to amass more extensive and systematic
data about all aspects of dispute resolution processes and practices, a state of affairs that has been a
longstanding concern of the dispute resolution field.”); id. at 207–08 (calling for greater transparency
of ADR professional backgrounds to study diversity).
130. See, e.g., Our Commitment, supra note 15 (FINRA arbitrator and mediator demographic
information); JAMS, JAMS PANELIST DEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY (CCP SECTION 1281.96) (2019),
https://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-Panelist-Demographic-Survey-2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8XE9-CBJU] (JAMS self-reported aggregate arbitrator and mediator demographic
information);
AM.
ARB.
ASS’N,
ARBITRATOR
DEMOGRAPHIC
DATA,
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/ArbitratorDemographicData_01132020
.pdf [https://perma.cc/YHE5-WNRZ] (AAA self-reported aggregate arbitrator and mediator
demographic information).
Some groups outside of these arbitral forums have begun identifying neutrals who are also racial
or ethnic minorities. See, e.g., NANCY M. THEVENIN & KATHERINE SIMPSON, SIMPSON DISP. RESOL.,
ARBITRATORS OF AFRICAN DESCENT, https://www.simpsonadr.net/files/ArbitratorsofAfricanDesce
ntAugust2020-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/9BM5-H65D] (list including self-identified FINRA
qualified arbitrators); ADR Resources: NBA Certified Panel of Arbitrators and Mediators: View Our
Roster
of
Certified
Arbitrators
and
Mediators,
NAT’L
BAR
ASS’N,
https://www.nationalbar.org/NBAR/about/Resources/ADR_RESOURCES/NBAR/content/ADR_Re
sources.aspx?hkey=646eda8a-d9a5-4450-b8ff-dcaa07a1d136
[https://perma.cc/BL59-5FGC]
(identifying arbitrators who are members of the National Bar Association, the largest association of
predominantly Black lawyers).
131. AM. ARB. ASS’N, supra note 130.
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of the responding arbitrators. JAMS data suggest a similar lack of
diversity, with 71.16% of responding arbitrators identifying as male, and
87.13% identifying as white.132 At 4.04%, JAMS has a similar proportion
of Black arbitrators as AAA.133
FINRA’s metrics looked very similar to AAA and JAMS in 2014 when
PIABA released its study of FINRA’s arbitrator pool demographics.134
PIABA is a bar association whose members represent claimants in FINRA
securities arbitration.135 It conducted its study to assess the fairness of
mandatory securities arbitration by looking to diversity, capture, and
disclosure in FINRA’s neutral roster.136 The PIABA Report focused on
the age and gender of all neutrals who appeared on a FINRA arbitrator
selection list.137 PIABA’s findings mirror AAA and JAMS current gender
demographics: an 80/20 split between male and female arbitrators.138 The
PIABA Report also found that the average age of a FINRA arbitrator was
sixty-nine, with 40% of the arbitrator pool over the age of seventy and
17% over the age of eighty.139 A FINRA Task Force charged with
studying the forum similarly found that diversity was a concern within the
forum and something FINRA should remedy.140
The PIABA Report and the Task Force’s findings appear to have
prompted FINRA Dispute Resolution to take a close look at its arbitrator
roster and to act.141 Starting in 2015, FINRA began measuring and sharing
aggregate, self-reported demographic information of arbitrator pool
members.142 These disclosures were shared by FINRA as a result of its
self-stated commitment “to provide transparency about the current
132. JAMS, supra note 130, at 2–3.
133. Id.
134. PIABA REPORT, supra note 3, at 28–30.
135. Id. at 1 n.1.
136. Id. at 8–9.
137. Id. at 26–27. PIABA relied upon Arbitrator Disclosure Reports provided to it by its members.
Id. at 26. Those members had received the reports while representing clients in the FINRA forum. Id.
138. Id. at 28–30.
139. Id.
140. FINRA DISP. RESOL. TASK FORCE, supra note 12, at 8 (“[T]he task force heard criticisms
about the lack of diversity in the FINRA arbitrator pool and agrees that diversity must be increased.”).
141. PIABA REPORT, supra note 3, at 11 (“Right now, investors are forced into FINRA’s flawed
system to seek justice. PIABA believes that a viable alternative would do much to clean up FINRA’s
arbitration system and, thus, urges Congress to pass the Investor Choice Act of 2013 making securities
arbitration optional for investors.”); Our Commitment, supra note 15 (“FINRA Dispute Resolution
Services embarked on an aggressive campaign to recruit new arbitrators with a particular focus on
adding arbitrators from diverse backgrounds, professions, and geographical locations . . . .”).
142. Our Commitment, supra note 15 (“To track our progress, we hired a third-party consultant to
survey—on an anonymous and voluntary basis—the demographics of the neutrals on our roster in
2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, and 2020.”); see also Volpe, supra note 125, at 209.
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makeup of our arbitrator roster.”143 The disclosures also responded both
to PIABA’s criticisms that the recruitment of arbitrators was a black box
by sharing what FINRA had done to address a lack of diversity within its
arbitrator pool144 and the 2015 Dispute Resolution Taskforce’s
recommendation that FINRA continue efforts to diversify the pool,
indicating that FINRA is positioned to make moves to increase diversity
in its forum.145 FINRA noted that it had reached out “to more than 100
minority and women’s organizations,” “attend[ed] conferences that attract
individuals of varied backgrounds,” and “network[ed] and host[ed] events
with diversity-based organizations” all in efforts to expand its arbitrator
roster.146
FINRA’s efforts to diversify its arbitrator roster have been
commended, though it and others recognize that additional work must be
undertaken.147 The demographics of FINRA’s arbitrator pool have shifted
since the PIABA Report and FINRA began its diversification
interventions.148 FINRA’s 2019 survey suggested that almost 40% of
arbitrator entrants that year were women, increasing the overall roster
percentage of women to 29%, a nearly 10% change from PIABA’s 2014
report.149 Black arbitrators comprised 19% of the new arbitrator entrants
in the 2019 survey, increasing the percentage of Black arbitrators from
4% to 9% of the FINRA roster in just five years.150 FINRA’s new
arbitrator entrants in recent years, on the whole, reflect greater diversity
than was present in the neutral pool in 2014.151 FINRA continues to take
143. Our Commitment, supra note 15. That FINRA states a commitment to disclosure is not
surprising given the significant role that disclosure plays as a regulatory device in securities laws. See,
e.g., Nicole G. Iannarone, Rethinking Automated Investment Adviser Disclosure, 50 U. TOL. L. REV.
433, 438–40 (2019) (describing ubiquity and role of disclosure across spectrum of securities
regulation).
144. See PIABA REPORT, supra note 3, at 7.
145. FINRA DISP. RESOL. TASK FORCE, supra note 12, app. IV at 2 (“FINRA should aggressively
recruit applicants for the arbitrator pool, with a view to increasing both the depth and the diversity of
the pool.”).
146. Our Commitment, supra note 15.
147. FINRA DISP. RESOL. TASK FORCE, supra note 12, at 9 (“The task force commends FINRA’s
recent recruitment efforts. It recommends that FINRA continue efforts to develop effective strategies
to recruit aggressively applicants for the arbitrator pool, with a view to increasing both the depth and
the diversity of the pool, and to monitor the results.”); id. at 9–10 (“FINRA’s website, as well as its
recruitment materials, should be reviewed to ensure that they convey a message of inclusiveness and
do not discourage from applying qualified and diverse individuals with a variety of educational
backgrounds and work experiences.”).
148. Compare PIABA REPORT, supra note 3, at 28–31 (PIABA 2014 findings), with Our
Commitment, supra note 15 (changes to neutral roster demographics since the PIABA report).
149. PIABA REPORT, supra note 3, at 28.
150. Our Commitment, supra note 15.
151. Id.
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steps to add more diverse arbitrators to its roster.152
Coupled with the transparency FINRA provides through its publicly
available awards, its recent efforts to diversify its arbitrator pool position
it well to serve as a case study into the impact of increasing arbitrator pool
diversity across mandatory arbitration forums. FINRA’s arbitrator pool
should be specifically examined to determine whether its interventions
resulted in inclusion. Societal focus on increasing diversity, equity, and
inclusion in recent years makes this an opportune time to investigate the
impact of diversity interventions on inclusion. Today, financial industry
participants, including FINRA member firms, seem invested in retreating
from the homogeneity that has plagued the field for decades, taking cues
from their constituents and protestors to denounce racism and highlight
commitments to equity and inclusion. FINRA reiterated its commitment
to diversity and inclusion mid-2020 after the death of George Floyd, with
its board publicly stating that it “support[s] management’s determination
to work collaboratively with others to promote greater diversity and
inclusion across the industry, so that the industry can better engage
traditionally underinvested communities and better represent and serve
the needs of all investors.”153 A year later, FINRA followed through on its
initial statement, issuing a request for comment “on any aspects of our
rules, operations and administrative processes that may create unintended
barriers to greater diversity and inclusion in the broker-dealer industry or
that might have unintended disparate impacts on those within the
industry.”154 SEC commissioners have repeatedly stated their support for
further diversification of who invests in America, closing the racial
investment gap.155
152. Id. (“While we are encouraged by these short-term results and incremental progress made, we
recognize this is a long-term effort. There is more progress to make and we remain fully committed
toward achieving our diversity goals.”).
153. Statement of the FINRA Board of Governors, FINRA (June 11, 2020),
https://www.finra.org/about/governance/finra-board-governors/statement-bog-from-june-11-2020
[https://perma.cc/HRR6-LQ8H].
154. Regulatory Notice 21-17: Diversity and Inclusion: FINRA Seeks Comment on Supporting
Diversity and Inclusion in the Broker-Dealer Industry, FINRA (Apr. 29, 2021),
https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/2021-04/Regulatory-Notice-21-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/
QGH6-V5WA]; see also Benjamin P. Edwards, FINRA Diversity Initiative, LAW PROFESSOR BLOGS
NETWORK: BUS. L. PROF BLOG (July 1, 2021), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/202
1/07/finra-diversity-initiative.html [https://perma.cc/7ZR3-V6MD]; Letter from Nicole G. Iannarone,
Assistant Professor of L., Drexel Univ. Sch. of L., to Jennifer Piorko Mitchell, Off. of the Corp. Sec’y,
FINRA (June 25, 2021), https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/NoticeComment/Nicole%20G.%20
Iannarone_6.25.2021%20-%202021%206%2025%20Iannarone%20Comment%20FINRA%20Reg
%20Notice%2021-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/FN3L-4SEV].
155. See, e.g., Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the Meeting of the
Investor Advisory Committee (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/clayton-
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Financial services firms based in Minneapolis, many of whom appear
regularly as respondents in the FINRA forum, also issued public
statements after George Floyd’s death supporting equity, anti-racism,
diversity, and inclusion.156 Ameriprise CEO Jim Cracchiolo publicly
denounced racism and recommitted to prior efforts to “be part of the
solution and a positive influence as an organization and industry
leader.”157 Cracchiolo committed to “furthering our important diversity
and inclusion efforts that have always served to strengthen our culture.”158
Leaders of major financial institutions outside Minneapolis likewise
publicly stated their support for Black Lives Matter and pledged to taking
substantial and meaningful steps to address racial disparities in their
companies.159 For example, Wells Fargo CEO Charles Scharf stated that
“our company will do all we can to support our diverse communities and
foster a company culture that deeply values and respects diversity and
inclusion.”160

iac-2020-09-24 [https://perma.cc/4JLS-X7XM] (“I firmly believe the Commission’s focus on
promoting diversity, inclusion, and opportunity, both within the SEC and in the industries and markets
we oversee, is of paramount importance. . . . Over 60 million U.S. households are currently invested
in our markets, but a closer look reveals considerable differences across demographic groups. For
example, while an estimated 61 percent of white households are invested, whether directly or through
retirement accounts, that number falls to 31 percent for black households and 28 percent for Hispanic
households. We should continually assess where we can do more to facilitate an inclusive
environment for new investors, and this is particularly true for those from underrepresented
communities in order to address the existing wealth gap.”).
156. See, e.g., Janet Levaux, Twin Cities Financial Firms Speak Out After Floyd’s Killing, Protests,
THINKADVISOR (June 1, 2020, 3:41 PM), https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2020/06/01/twin-citiesfinancial-firms-speak-out-after-floyds-killing-protests/ [https://perma.cc/27BK-HWBN] (detailing
statements by CEOs in the Minneapolis/St. Paul area).
157. Jim Cracchiolo, A Message from Jim Cracchiolo, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer,
AMERIPRISE FIN. (June 2, 2020), https://www.ameriprise.com/financial-planning/about/responsiblebusiness/message-from-CEO/ [https://perma.cc/KU46-W4XD].
158. Id.
159. See, e.g., Hugh Son, ‘Appalled’—Here’s What Wall Street CEOs Are Saying About the Killing
of George Floyd and Protests Rocking US Cities, CNBC (June 1, 2020, 3:15 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/01/wall-street-ceos-speak-out-about-george-floyd-and-protestsrocking-us-cities.html [https://perma.cc/66DS-C534] (collecting public statements of financial
institution leaders); id. (statement of Citigroup’s Chief Financial Officer) (“These systemic problems
will not go away until we confront them head on. So we must continue to speak up and speak out
whenever we witness hatred, racism or injustice.”); id. (statement of Jamie Dimon, CEO of J.P.
Morgan Chase) (“Now, more than ever, each of us must be inclusive in our work and in the
neighborhoods where we operate.”); id. (statement of Brian Moynihan, CEO of Bank of America)
(“[W]e can and will build on what our company is already doing. . . . This includes our ongoing work
to help drive diversity and inclusion, racial equality, economic opportunity and upward mobility, and
to deliver on our purpose.”).
160. Id.
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Measuring Impact of FINRA’s Arbitrator Pool Diversification

The current seemingly-universal statements calling for greater
diversity and inclusion within the financial industry and within FINRA’s
arbitrator pool must be assessed to determine if the financial industry
assertions are in fact being implemented or are better described as “wokewashing.”161 Recognizing that FINRA admits that it has work to do does
not mean, however, that its progress to date should not be studied to
determine if investment in arbitrator recruitment efforts translates into
new entrants serving as arbitrators.162 Or, in other words, now that more
are invited to the pool, are they included in the free swim?
FINRA’s diversity metrics do not include information concerning
whether and to what extent the newly-recruited members of its arbitrator
pool have been selected to serve as arbitrators.163 FINRA may believe that
the diversity of the pool, and not of whether diverse panelists are selected,
is the most important metric.164 ADR experts, however, disagree.165
Inclusion within ADR can only be achieved if all arbitrators on the roster
have a real opportunity to, and do, serve as neutrals adjudicating a
proceeding.166 Indeed, some argue that diverse neutrals may be deterred
from joining a forum if it is not evident that they will be included
therein.167 FINRA publicly asserts, and many scholars agree, that FINRA
161. Erin Dowell & Marlette Jackson, “Woke-Washing” Your Company Won’t Cut It, HARV. BUS.
REV.
(July
27,
2020),
https://hbr.org/2020/07/woke-washing-your-company-wont-cut-it
[https://perma.cc/U24G-Q4PG] (defining woke-washing as “appropriating the language of social
activism into marketing materials”); see also Marcia Narine Weldon, Wokewashing and the Board,
LAW PROFESSOR BLOGS NETWORK: BUS. L. PROF BLOG (Aug. 14, 2020),
https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2020/08/wokewashing-and-the-board.html
[https://perma.cc/5ME2-AA6U] (“Wokewashing occurs when a company attempts to show solidarity
with certain causes in order to gain public favor.”); Dowell & Jackson, supra (“Empty company
statements can seem to say that Black lives only matter to big business when there’s profit to be
made.”).
162. See Our Commitment, supra note 15.
163. See id. (noting statistics only relating to members of the arbitrator and mediator pool, not
whether they are chosen on cases).
164. See id.; Raagas De Ramos, supra note 19 (writing FINRA Director of Dispute Resolution
Services “says it’s not about having diversity matching between the actual arbitrators selected and a
party for a case, but it’s all about the pool of arbitrators”).
165. See, e.g., Cole, Arbitrator Diversity, supra note 1, at 969–70; Feerick & Gerstel, supra note
81, at 3 (“Improving the diversity of the pool of candidates is not enough if parties and counsel do not
select diverse candidates. Setting benchmarks and collecting data on progress and publishing, and
aggregating data help promote transparency about the state of diversity and facilitate
improvements.”).
166. See Cole, Arbitrator Diversity, supra note 1, at 968–69.
167. Volpe, supra note 125, at 212 (“[I]f the extent of varied backgrounds cannot be identified,
efforts to attract future pools of applicants from them may be stifled because, among other reasons,
they may not feel welcome.”).
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believes in transparency concerning the demographic makeup of its
arbitrator pool168 and it is on the whole more transparent than most
arbitration forums.169 If FINRA provided additional information not
currently publicly available—such as the names of the arbitrators
associated with each hearing location, the date when the arbitrator joined
the roster, the number of times each arbitrator’s name has been included
as a potential arbitrator on a list to the parties, the number of times the
arbitrator has been appointed to serve, and the number of times the
arbitrator served on a customer proceeding that resulted in a hearing and
concluded with an award—FINRA’s efforts to foster diversity and
inclusion could be evaluated.170 Nevertheless, these current limitations
should not halt assessment efforts. Evaluation of the limits of existing
transparency and diversity efforts provide guidance to other arbitration
forums seeking to become more representative of the consumers whose
claims they determine. FINRA’s current disclosure regime provides a
basis from which to evaluate two different but related concepts: (1) the
utility of FINRA’s transparency; and (2) whether and to what extent
newly recruited arbitrators, who exhibit more diversity than the pre-2015
pool, are included. In order to so study, an understanding of mechanics of
arbitrator selection in FINRA proceedings is necessary.

168. See Our Commitment, supra note 15 (“FINRA strives to provide transparency about the
current makeup of our arbitrator roster.”); Gross, The End of Mandatory Securities Arbitration?,
supra note 4, at 1188 (“FINRA Dispute Resolution actively promotes transparency of the arbitration
process.”). But see Choi et al., supra note 115, at 45 (arguing that the FINRA forum is not transparent);
Barr, supra note 4, at 809 (describing lack of transparency, including lack of written decisions, as a
“[p]rocedural [b]arrier[] to [f]ull and [f]air [a]djudication”).
169. See Iannarone, Finding Light, supra note 13, at 2–3.
170. See Volpe, supra note 125, at 213 (“While it is relatively easy to make a strong case for
diversity in the dispute resolution field, its measurement remains challenging. Much needed are
(1) demographic statistics, (2) a more explicit characterization of diversity itself, and (3) how context
impacts diversity in the dispute resolution field.”). On the other hand, the public provision of some
information—demographic information associated with each arbitrator—may prove problematic as
some arbitrators might be reluctant to share it and parties might use it in unintended ways. See, e.g.,
id. at 212 (“Due to the limited access to processes, concerns about implicit biases, stigmas, and other
reasons for non-disclosure, the measurement of diversity in the dispute resolution field remains
daunting.”); see also Choi et al., supra note 115, at 60 (“We also note that the decision makers in the
FINRA system function as a type of hybrid between a judge and a jury. The potential effect of juror
experience as well as race, gender, and other juror characteristics has led to a complex system of jury
selection. Given the potential significance of juror selection, a literature has developed on the extent
to which it is appropriate for parties to consider certain characteristics in the selection or challenge of
jurors. The parties to a FINRA arbitration participate in the selection of the arbitrators, just as litigants
do in the selection of juries, but not judges. The party selection system raises the additional question,
not presented by the judicial decision-making literature, of whether party selection can mitigate or
eliminate the effect of characteristics that might bias the decision maker.”).
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III. FINRA ARBITRATORS: POOL AND SELECTION
Arbitrator qualification and selection has long been viewed as
necessary to ensure the substantive fairness to investor claimants and been
a continued focus as FINRA and regulators review the FINRA Code of
Customer Procedure.171 From the inception of securities arbitration to
today, arbitrator selection has shifted to provide parties with more agency
in selecting who will resolve the dispute in order to promote investor trust
and confidence.172 Yet, the system also has embedded structural barriers
preventing the expansion of the arbitrator roster for smaller claims—the
very types of disputes that were so necessary to ensuring public trust and
confidence in the securities markets. The following section provides an
overview of the FINRA arbitrator qualification and selection system to
contextualize the empirical analysis to come.
A.

Evolution of Arbitrator Qualification and Selection

As early as 1977, the forum selected arbitrators in customer securities
arbitration cases, a convention that continued for twenty years.173 Thus,
by the time the Supreme Court began its embrace of mandatory securities
arbitration in McMahon and its progeny, parties had nearly a decade’s
worth of experience in a forum where they could not choose an
arbitrator.174 Shortly after the Supreme Court blessed securities arbitration
in McMahon, the SEC began evaluating arbitrator classification and
selection, asking whether individuals with significant securities
experience, such as retired industry members, should serve as public

171. See Gross, supra note 75, at 119; FINRA DISP. RESOL. TASK FORCE, supra note 12, at 6 (“The
quality of dispute resolution at the FINRA forum depends greatly on the abilities and commitment of
the individuals who serve as arbitrators.”); NASD DISP. RESOL., THE ARBITRATION POLICY TASK
FORCE REPORT: A REPORT CARD 7 (2007), https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/Industry/p0364
66.pdf [https://perma.cc/92D4-2WQS] (“The core component of any arbitration system is, of course,
the arbitrators.”).
172. See, e.g., FINRA DISP. RESOL. TASK FORCE, supra note 12, at 46 (“[D]espite FINRA’s
adoption of rule changes designed to increase investor confidence (e.g., neutral-list selection
procedures for arbitrators, the all public panel option), criticisms of mandatory arbitration persist, and
the lack of investor choice continues to generate at least some distrust of the FINRA forum.”).
173. See SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION: NINTH REPORT 12 (1996);
SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, FIRST REPORT: REPORT OF THE SECURITIES
INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 4–5
(1977); see also Katsoris, supra note 80, at 67 (“Initially, the Old Uniform Code provided that the
Director of Arbitration of the SRO choose the panel and its chairperson, and directed that the majority
of the panel of arbitrators be public arbitrators (not be from the securities industry) . . . . ”).
174. See Katsoris, supra note 80, at 67.
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arbitrators and whether additional training was necessary.175 The
Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration (SICA) responded with a
new model code specifying how public and industry arbitrators were to be
classified and recommending that investor disputes would be resolved by
a majority public panel, changes the SEC ultimately adopted.176
But it was not until 1998 that parties had a voice in selecting arbitrators
for securities disputes.177 The change was recommended in a 1996 report
by the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) Arbitration
Policy Task Force.178 The reforms recommended by the Ruder Report
focused on meeting two aims: “first, the selection of unbiased, competent,
experienced arbitrators, and second, opportunity for the parties to
participate in arbitrator selection.”179 The change was embraced by NASD
“as a general principle that parties in arbitration be given more input into
the selection of arbitrators.”180
175. Letter from Richard G. Ketchum, Dir., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, to James E. Buck, Senior
Vice President & Sec’y, N.Y. Stock Exch. 2 (Sept. 10, 1987) (on file with Washington Law Review)
(“[I]ndustry affiliations of public arbitrators may undermine public confidence regardless of the
character of the individual arbitrator.”); id. at 4 (“[T]he SROs have administered virtually no formal
training for arbitrators on matters relating to either . . . relevant state law, or securities law.”); see also
Jennifer J. Johnson, Wall Street Meets the Wild West: Bringing Law and Order to Securities
Arbitration, 84 N.C. L. REV. 123, 165 (2005) (arguing that NASD did not adequately train arbitrators
and that the lack of expert arbitrators is detrimental to securities arbitration).
176. See Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc.,
National Associations of Securities Dealers, Inc., and the American Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to
the Arbitration Process and the Use of Predispute Arbitration Clauses, Exchange Act Release
No. 26,805, 54 Fed. Reg. 21,144 (May 10, 1989). See generally Mahlon M. Frankhauser & Linda M.
Gardner, An Up-to-Date Review of Judicial, Legislative, and Regulatory Developments in Arbitration
with Financial Institutions, 46 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 583, 614–24 (1989) (describing post-McMahon
changes to securities arbitration procedures).
177. See Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule Change and Notice of Filing and Order
Granting Accelerated Approval to Amendment Nos. 3 and 4 to Proposed Rule Change by the National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., Relating to Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving
Public Customers, Exchange Act Release No. 40,555, 63 Fed. Reg. 56,670 (Oct. 22, 1998).
178. See generally DAVID S. RUDER, LINDA D. FIENBERG, JOHN W. BACHMANN, STEPHEN J.
FRIEDMAN, STEPHEN L. HAMMERMAN, J. BOYD PAGE, FRANCIS O. SPALDING & RICHARD E. SPEIDEL,
SECURITIES ARBITRATION REFORM: REPORT OF THE ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE (1996)
[hereinafter RUDER REPORT].
179. David S. Ruder, Elements of a Fair and Efficient Securities Arbitration System, 40 ARIZ. L.
REV. 1101, 1104 (1998).
180. Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change by the National Association of Securities Dealers,
Inc. Relating to the Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, Exchange
Act Release No. 40,261, 63 Fed. Reg. 40,761 (July 24, 1998); see also Order Granting Approval to
Proposed Rule Change and Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval to Amendment
Nos. 3 and 4 to Proposed Rule Change by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.,
Relating to Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, Exchange Act
Release No. 40,555, 63 Fed. Reg. at 56,681–84 (approving NASD arbitrator classification and
selection procedures); NASD DISP. RESOL., supra note 171, at 7 (“In November 1998, NASD
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Subsequent years brought additional refinements, a process resulting
from SRO monitoring of arbitrator selection in action.181 The
“complicated rotational system” from which arbitrator names were drawn
for selection was replaced “with a simplified random selection system” in
2007.182 In response to party complaints about “inexperienced
chairpersons,” the arbitration code was also amended to create a new,
separate list of chair-qualified arbitrators who completed a specialized
training session and had certain experiences as an arbitrator within the
forum before they were allowed to preside as a chair over a claim.183 A
chair leads the arbitration proceedings and has other responsibilities
separate from the rest of the panel.184 Previously, NASD had only offered
voluntary training to arbitrators chosen to serve as a chair, but no other
experiential or educational qualification had been required for chair

implemented the arbitrator list selection system. . . . NLSS allows the parties to have direct input into
the arbitrator selection process and ensures that NASD stuff does not control arbitrator
appointment.”).
181. See Gross, supra note 75, at 22 (“NASD Dispute Resolution has been actively monitoring the
quality of its arbitrator roster in recent years, and has adopted the Neutral List Selection System for
arbitrator selection and has enhanced its training and testing requirements.”).
182. NASD DISP. RESOL., supra note 171, at 7.
183. See Order Approving Proposed Rule Change and Amendments 1, 2, 3, and 4 to Amend NASD
Arbitration Rules for Industry Disputes and Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated
Approval of Amendments 5, 6, and 7 Thereto, Exchange Act Release No. 55,158, 72 Fed. Reg. 4573
(Jan. 31, 2007) (approving changes to require training and prior service to serve as public chair
arbitrator); NASD DISP. RESOL., supra note 171, at 7, 10–11 (“In response to the Task Force [Ruder]
Report, NASD developed a training course in 1996 designed to assist arbitrators serving as
chairpersons. The course instructs arbitrators on the additional responsibilities of arbitrators assuming
the crucial role of chairperson. In 2003, NASD updated the materials for the chairperson course and
converted the course to an online format. In the Revised Code [applicable in 2007], successful
completion of this course will be a prerequisite for serving as a chairperson, unless the arbitrator can
demonstrate substantially equivalent training or experience.”); FINRA OFF. OF DISP.
RESOL., CHAIRPERSON TRAINING 6 (2021), https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/FINRA_Chairp
erson_Training.pdf [https://perma.cc/CUZ3-C4LR] (“In their unique role, Chairpersons must:
[e]nsure that their fellow panelists display appropriate arbitrator qualities[;] [s]et an appropriate tone
with the panel and the parties during all arbitration stages[;] [d]emonstrate respect for all panel
members and involve them in conducting fair hearings that result in final decisions on all properly
submitted issues[;] [d]emonstrate respect for all parties, representatives, and other hearing
participants.”).
184. See Regulatory Notice 21-04: FINRA Amends Arbitration Codes to Increase Arbitrator
Chairperson Honoraria and Certain Arbitration Fees, FINRA (Apr. 19, 2021),
https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/notices/21-04 [https://perma.cc/5YFL-SCVC] (“[C]hairs are
required to lead the prehearing conferences and perform additional tasks in connection with the
prehearings, such as setting discovery, briefing and motion deadlines, scheduling subsequent hearing
sessions, and drafting prehearing orders.”); JASON RYAN DOSS & RICHARD STANISLAW
FRANKOWSKI, THE PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO SECURITIES ARBITRATION 122 (2013) (“The rationale
for having the chairperson roster is to ensure that at least one of the arbitrators on a panel has
experience in procedural and substantive issues that arise in arbitration proceedings.”).
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service until 2007.185 FINRA has continued to modify the arbitrator
selection process, with changes to chair eligibility requirements and
classification of arbitrators as public or non-public, changes that impact
who is able to hear various types of claims.186
B.

Arbitrator Selection Process Today

Today, the selection of arbitrators is guided by the quantum of relief
requested by the party initiating the claim, known as the claimant.187
Smaller claims are heard by a one-arbitrator panel, and larger claims are
heard by a panel of three arbitrators unless the parties agree otherwise in
writing.188 The cut-off point for one arbitrator cases is $100,000; in cases
greater than that amount, or cases in which the claimant does not specify
the amount of monetary damages, a three-arbitrator panel will decide the

185. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change and Amendments 1, 2, 3, and 4 to Amend NASD
Arbitration Rules for Industry Disputes and Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated
Approval of Amendments 5, 6, and 7 Thereto, Exchange Act Release No. 55,158, 72 Fed. Reg. at
4586–87 (approving change requiring public arbitrators to complete training and experience
minimums before serving as a chair); Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change and Amendment
Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 Thereto to Amend NASD Arbitration Rules for Customer Disputes, Exchange Act
Release No. 51,856, 70 Fed. Reg. 36,442 (June 15, 2005) (proposal to change customer code to require
training and other qualifications prior to serving as a public chair); Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule
Change and Amendment Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 Thereto to Amend NASD Arbitration Rules for Customer
Disputes, Exchange Act Release No. 51,857, 70 Fed. Reg. 36,430, 36,434 (June 15, 2005) (“Although
NASD provides voluntary chairperson training to its arbitrators, arbitrators who serve as chairperson
are not currently required to have chairperson training, to have any particular experience, or to meet
any other specific criteria beyond the requirements for serving as an arbitrator. Over the years, one of
the most frequent suggestions for improving the quality and efficiency of NASD arbitrations is to
ensure that chairpersons, who play a vital role in the administration of cases, have some degree of
arbitrator experience and training. NASD agrees that requiring trained and experienced chairpersons
would significantly enhance the quality of its arbitration forum.”).
186. See Choi et al, supra note 115, at 52–57 (describing post-1998 changes to FINRA arbitrator
selection process through 2014); see also Barr, supra note 4, at 803 (“FINRA and the SEC [have]
garnered praise for this move, but its actual impact is not yet clear.”). An arbitrator is classified as
non-public if they are qualified to serve as an arbitrator but have industry ties. FINRA, RULE 12100(t)
(2020); see also id. 12100(aa)(1)–(4) (listing reasons for permanent bar from serving as a public
arbitrator by virtue of working for an entity regulated by the SEC, serving for more than 15 years as
an attorney or other professional to an SEC-regulated entity, or working for more than 15 years for a
bank or similar entity that engaged in securities transactions); id. 12100(5)–(11) (describing
temporary disqualification for service as public arbitrator due to own business activities, activities of
employer, or immediate family member). A public arbitrator is any arbitrator who is not excluded
from service due to significant industry ties. See generally id.
187. See Arbitrator Selection, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/arbitration-mediation/arbitratorselection [https://perma.cc/AT3B-H5MX] (describing how arbitrators are selected in investor and
industry cases); FINRA, RULE 12100(g) (“The term ‘claimant’ means a party that files the statement
of claim that initiates an arbitration under Rule 12302.”); see also Barr, supra note 4, at 802
(describing arbitrator selection process and critiques thereof).
188. See generally FINRA, RULE 12401 (2012).
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case.189 One need not be an attorney in order to serve as a FINRA
arbitrator, but instead must only have “at least five years of paid business
and/or professional experience—inside or outside of the securities
industry—and at least two years of college-level credits.”190 It surprises
many that an arbitrator deciding a FINRA proceeding need not be a lawyer
and need not have (and, in fact must not have, in many circumstances)
securities industry experience. A significant percentage of FINRA
arbitrators are not lawyers.191 Throughout the years, there has been debate
about whether securities or legal experience is necessary to securities
arbitration, with the forum opting to strike a balance between experienced
arbitrators and lay persons, a decision that some argue reduces arbitrator
competence.192
Parties drive arbitrator selection through a striking and ranking
process.193 Within thirty days after the last respondent’s answer is due,
FINRA sends NLSS-generated lists to the parties so that they can strike
and rank arbitrators.194 In three-arbitrator cases, three lists are randomly

189. Id. 12401(c) (describing panel composition in cases where monetary damages sought by
claimant exceeds $100,000 or are not specified).
190. Become
an
Arbitrator:
Frequently
Asked
Questions
(FAQ),
FINRA,
https://www.finra.org/arbitration-mediation/become-arbitrator-frequently-asked-questions-faq
[https://perma.cc/QTA9-F5PC].
191. Gross, supra note 75, at 31–33 (noting that, in 2008, “more than half of NASD arbitrators
[were] not lawyers”).
192. Ruder, supra note 179, at 1104 (“The Task Force struggled with the question whether
arbitrators should be professionals who could bring expertise and procedural consistency to the
arbitration process or whether they should be lay persons who would provide the informal and
equitable characteristics customarily associated with arbitration. The Task Force recommended that
arbitration panels continue to be composed of one industry member with knowledge and expertise
regarding brokerage firm operation and securities matters and two public arbitrators. In recognition
of the increasing procedural and substantive complexity of securities arbitration, the Task Force also
recommended that panel chairs ‘should be required to demonstrate a strong command of NASD
arbitration procedure and general arbitration techniques, as well as familiarity with industry practices
and substantive law.’” (quoting RUDER REPORT, supra note 178)); FINRA DISP. RESOL. TASK FORCE,
supra note 12, at 9 (“While the task force agreed that a deep and diverse pool of arbitrators is important
to the operation of the forum, members expressed different views about the most important
characteristics in an arbitrator. . . . Simply put, the question is whether the arbitrator should more
closely resemble a juror or judge. Since the task force was not able to reach consensus on this question,
it decided that the best solution was for FINRA to develop an arbitrator pool with sufficient variety
to reflect the parties’ preferences.”).
193. FINRA, RULE 12400 (2020) (describing Neutral List Selection System and public chairperson
eligibility); id. 12402(d), (f) (2017) (arbitrator selection in one-arbitrator cases); id. 12403(c)–(d)
(2017) (arbitrator panel selection in three-arbitrator cases).
194. FINRA, RULE 12402 (2017) (cases with one arbitrator); id. 12403(c) (2017) (cases with three
arbitrators).

Iannarone (Do Not Delete)

1424

12/14/2021 9:52 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:1389

generated by NLSS195 and sent to the parties.196 These lists include one
list of fifteen public arbitrators, one list of ten non-public arbitrators, and
one list of ten public, chair-qualified arbitrators.197 An arbitrator is
classified as non-public if they are qualified to serve as an arbitrator but
have industry ties.198 A public arbitrator is any arbitrator who is not
excluded from service due to significant industry ties.199 To become a
chairperson, a public arbitrator must either (1) be a lawyer and have
served as an arbitrator on at least one arbitration case that concluded in an
award after a hearing or (2) have served on three arbitration panels that
concluded in an award after a hearing.200 Public chairpersons currently
have two chances to be selected in a three-arbitrator case; if their name
does not appear on the chairperson list, they are eligible to be listed on the
public list.201 In the Philadelphia hearing location,202 for instance, as of
September 2021, there were thirty-two public chairs and 134 public
arbitrators.203 If a customer claim seeking more than $100,000 was filed
and assigned to the Philadelphia hearing location at that time, assuming
that none of the Philadelphia chairs have a conflict barring their service,204
ten names would be drawn from thirty-two205 to populate the public chair
195. Arbitrator Selection, supra note 187 (“The NLSS arbitrator list selection process is random.
The randomized process has been verified by an Ernst & Young audit in a report that confirmed that
a ‘random pool management algorithm [is] used to ensure that each arbitrator in the pool has the same
opportunity to appear on a list as all other arbitrators in that pool.’”).
196. Id.
197. FINRA, RULE 12403(a) (2017).
198. Id. 12100(t) (2020); see also id. 12100(aa)(1)–(4) (listing reasons for permanent bar from
serving as a public arbitrator by virtue of working for an entity regulated by the SEC, serving for more
than fifteen years as an attorney or other professional to an SEC regulated entity, or working for more
than fifteen years for a bank or similar entity that engaged in securities transactions); id. 12100(aa)(5)–
(11) (describing temporary disqualification for service as public arbitrator due to own business
activities, activities of employer, or immediate family member).
199. Id. 12100(aa).
200. Id. 12100(c) (describing requirements for chair qualification).
201. Id. 12403(a)(2) (2017) (“The Neutral List Selection System will generate the chairperson list
first. Chair-qualified arbitrators who were not selected for the chairperson list will be eligible for
selection on the public list. An individual arbitrator cannot appear on both the chairperson list and the
public list for the same case.”).
202. Philadelphia is the hearing location nearest the author.
203. Hearing Location Statistics, supra note 30.
204. FINRA, RULE 12403(a)(3) (2017).
205. If a hearing location has less than thirty public chair arbitrators, FINRA alters the chair
selection procedure by adding non-local public chairs to the pool. See Hearing Location Statistics,
supra note 30 (“We expand arbitrator pools in select hearing locations as case demand requires.”);
Notice of Filing of a Proposed Rule Change Amending Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer
Disputes and Industry Disputes Relating to Broadening Chairperson Eligibility, Exchange Act
Release No. 78,729, 81 Fed. Reg. 61,288 (Sept. 6, 2016) (“To expand the roster of public chairpersons
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list.206 The remaining twenty-two names would then be added to the 134
public arbitrators. From these 156 names, fifteen would be chosen to
populate the public arbitrator list.207
Each separately represented party then engages in striking and ranking
of arbitrators on each list.208 Of the ten names on the public chairperson
list, each separately represented party may strike up to four and must then
rank the remaining six chairs in order of the party’s preference.209 A
similar process occurs for the public arbitrator list, except that each
separately represented party may strike up to six names from the list.210
After the parties’ rankings are combined, FINRA selects the highest
ranking non-stricken name on each of list to serve as the public chair and
the public arbitrator.211
The non-public arbitrator selection mechanism follows a different
procedure, permitting parties to strike up to all of the arbitrators on the
non-public arbitration list.212 The rationale for this option is to ensure that
customers have the ability to obtain an all-public panel if they so
choose.213 Many practitioners representing claimants may wish to strike
all of the industry members unless the claimant has a particularly strong
claim where the stockbroker is clearly engaged in substantial
misconduct.214 If any names remain on the non-public list, the highest

in locations where the ratio of cases to qualified public chairpersons is higher, FINRA asks many
public chairpersons to serve in multiple hearing locations.”); Arbitration Selection, supra note 187
(noting that three passes used by NLSS “to ensure that there is a sufficient arbitrator pool from which
to generate random lists” for arbitrator selection).
206. FINRA, RULE 12403(a)(1) (2017).
207. Id.
208. See generally id. 12403(c). When I teach arbitrator selection to students, I share knowledge I
gained from experienced claimants counsel, who have cautioned me about naming too many parties
as respondents—in addition to increasing the complexity of the proceeding with marginal gain, it is
possible for respondents to coordinate their ranking and striking to eliminate nearly all but their top
choices for arbitrator. This provision for the ranking and striking of arbitrators presents opportunities
for gamesmanship and its impact should be further examined, particularly where there is a mismatch
between the number of parties and their respective resources. For example, claimants may have less
ability to afford private counsel whereas brokerage firms may have inhouse counsel available to
defend the firm and more significant monetary resources to obtain outside counsel for their
stockbroker employees in the same proceeding.
209. FINRA, RULE 12403(c)(2) (2017).
210. Id.
211. See id. 12403(d)–(e) (describing list combination and selection procedure).
212. Id. 12403(c)(1); see also DOSS & FRANKOWSKI, supra note 184, at 124.
213. Regulatory Notice 11-05: Customer Option to Choose an All Public Arbitration Panel in All
Cases,
FINRA
(Feb.
1,
2011),
https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/notices/11-05
[https://perma.cc/9FKB-F9LY] (codification of the all-public panel option).
214. Cf. Choi et al., supra note 115, at 46 (“FINRA’s reforms to the definition of ‘independent
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ranked remaining arbitrator, after combining the parties’ respective
rankings, will serve on the panel.215 If no non-public arbitrator remains,
that space on the panel will be filled from the highest remaining public
arbitrator on the public arbitrator list remaining after a public arbitrator is
selected, followed by the chair list if the public arbitrator list cannot fill
the vacancy.216
Cases decided by one arbitrator follow a similar procedure, except that
the sole arbitrator is selected from a single list of public, chair-qualified
arbitrators.217 Each separately represented party may strike up to four of
the arbitrators on the public chair list, and they then rank any remaining
arbitrators, with FINRA choosing the highest ranked remaining arbitrator
to preside over the case after combining the parties’ respective
rankings.218
C.

Barriers to Public Chair Qualification

Restrictive experiential requirements hinder public arbitrators’ ability
to become chair-qualified. As a result of arbitrator selection mechanisms,
single arbitrator proceedings present an interesting scenario. These
proceedings determine smaller claims and are the reason for which a
uniform arbitration code was originally created to address the need to
instill public trust in arbitration and the securities markets.219 Smaller
claims can only be decided by public arbitrators who possess a
combination of experience in hearing cases and complete specialized
training, but who have no specialized experience in the securities industry
lest their industry experience render them biased and unfairly prejudice
claimants.220 As is true with cases that begin in a trial court, few
arbitrator’ suggest concern about the role arbitrator background may play in the outcome of arbitration
cases. The party selection process, however, may mitigate these effects as parties reject arbitrators
who may be unsympathetic to their claims.”). This choice is supported by scholarship establishing a
correlation between an arbitrator’s industry experience and a lower dollar recovery for unrepresented
claimants. Id. at 73; see also Edwards, The Dark Side of Self-Regulation, supra note 57, at 587
(“[A]rbitrator background certainly influences outcome for investor claimants.”).
215. FINRA, RULE 12403(d) (2017).
216. Id. 12403(e)(3).
217. See generally FINRA, RULE 12402 (2017) (describing selection of arbitrators in one-arbitrator
cases).
218. Id. 12402(d)–(f).
219. See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text.
220. FINRA, RULE 12400(c) (2020) (describing eligibility criteria for inclusion on FINRA
chairperson roster); see also Arbitrators FAQ, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/arbitrationmediation/overview/additional-resources/faq/arbitrators [https://perma.cc/43BA-WCJX]
(“Arbitrators are eligible for the chairperson roster if they have completed chairperson training
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proceedings initiated in the FINRA forum conclude with an arbitrator’s
award after a hearing.221 For example, of all cases decided in the FINRA
forum in 2019—industry and customer—only 13% were decided by
arbitrators after a regular hearing.222 Thus, after the 2007 chair
qualifications were added, in order to qualify to appear on an arbitrator
selection list for a smaller customer case, an arbitrator must have
proceeded through several steps, which might take a significant amount
of time to complete.223
The arbitrator could complete the prerequisites by serving as a public
arbitrator in customer cases seeking greater than $100,000.224 To proceed
through this path, first, the arbitrator must appear on a list of public
arbitrators in a customer case, not be stricken by any party, and be ranked
high enough by all parties to be selected.225 Public arbitrators already face
an uphill battle in this regard as public, chair-qualified arbitrators who are
not already listed on the public chair list are included in the pool from
which the public list is selected.226 Even if a public arbitrator makes it past
these two barriers, the public arbitrator must also be lucky enough to serve
on one of the historical average of 18% of cases that proceeds to an award

provided by FINRA and: have a law degree and are a member of a bar of at least one jurisdiction and
have served as an arbitrator through award on at least one arbitration administered by a self-regulatory
organization in which hearings have held; or have served as an arbitrator through award on at least
three arbitrations administered by a self-regulatory organization in which hearings were held.”); Choi
et al., supra note 115, at 46 (“FINRA’s reforms to the definition of ‘independent arbitrator’ suggest
concern about the role arbitrator background may play in the outcome of arbitration cases.”).
221. See, e.g., Resolution and Results for Customers, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/arbitrationmediation/resolution-and-results-customers [https://perma.cc/P9EW-TVJ5] (“In FINRA arbitration,
the majority of customer cases—approximately 69%—result in settlements reached by the parties.
Typically, approximately 18% of all cases proceed to award.”).
222. Dispute Resolution Statistics, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/arbitration-mediation/disputeresolution-statistics#virtual [https://perma.cc/P54A-ZFXS].
223. FINRA, RULE 12400(c) (2020).
224. Regulatory Notice 11-05: Customer Option to Choose an All Public Arbitration Panel in All
Cases, supra note 213, at 2.
225. See FINRA, RULE 12403 (2017) (describing selection process for public arbitrators in threearbitrator cases).
226. Id. 12403(a)(2) (describing public chairs’ double chance to appear in a three-arbitrator
proceeding, on either the public chair or public arbitrator lists). Note also that public chairs who
obtained the experiential qualifications to serve as such before 2007 were eligible for their names to
be listed on two lists, increasing their changes of obtaining the experiential qualification. See Notice
of Filing of Proposed Rule Change and Amendment Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 Thereto to Amend NASD
Arbitration Rules for Customer Disputes, Exchange Act Release No. 51,856, 70 Fed. Reg. 36,442
(June 15, 2005) (proposal to change NASD customer code to require training and other qualifications
prior to serving as a public chair in a customer case; describing prior selection process). That structural
preference for arbitrators on the roster longer persists with the 2007 rule change. Id.
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after a hearing instead of settling or being dismissed or withdrawn.227
Among the criteria parties use to evaluate arbitrators for the ranking and
striking process is the arbitrator’s past awards. This suggests that when a
party is faced with the choice of striking an arbitrator with an acceptable
and known award history versus an arbitrator with no record, the party
will strike the new arbitrator, making it less likely for a new arbitrator to
be selected.228 Some argue that the arbitrators who are most often chosen
are those whose awards are most middle of the road.229 Moreover, there
has been a significant decrease in the number of arbitration claims filed in
recent years,230 thus lessening the chance that any arbitrator will gain the
227. See, e.g., Resolution and Results for Customers, supra note 221 (“In FINRA arbitration, the
majority of customer cases—approximately 69%—result in settlements reached by the parties.
Typically, approximately 18% of all cases proceed to award.”). NASD recognized that the
experiential qualification for public chair service would take time to meet due to the small percentage
of claims that concluded via hearing, then four percentage points higher than the current rate. See
Order Approving Proposed Rule Change and Amendments 1, 2, 3, and 4 to Amend NASD Arbitration
Rules for Industry Disputes and Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of
Amendments 5, 6, and 7 Thereto, Exchange Act Release No. 55,158, 72 Fed. Reg. 4573, 4587 (Jan.
31, 2007) (“NASD stated that it believes the requirement that an arbitrator serve on at least three
arbitrations through award to be eligible for the chair roster is an objective standard that is easily
measured, though not easy to meet. NASD stated that of the arbitration cases filed in the past four
years, approximately 22% went to hearing.” (footnotes omitted)).
228. DOSS & FRANKOWSKI, supra note 184, at 124 (“It is important for parties to conduct due
diligence on the proposed arbitrators prior to ranking them. . . . Practitioners typically review
FINRA’s award database located on the FINRA website to gather more information about each case
ruled upon by the proposed arbitrators . . . .”); Choi et al., supra note 115, at 48 (“With respect to
professional and retired arbitrators, whom some commentators have observed might display a more
subtle form of bias due to their desire to be selected in future cases, we find some evidence that these
arbitrators tend to issue lower awards. Further, we find that this effect is not mitigated by legal
representation.”); La Rue & Symonette, supra note 125, at 221 (“[T]he parties almost consistently
select arbitrators with whom they are comfortable based on reputation or prior experience.”).
229. See, e.g., Colleen Honigsberg & Matthew Jacob, Deleting Misconduct: The Expungement of
BrokerCheck Records, 139 J. FIN. ECON. 800, 803 (2021) (“Theoretically, if both parties select the
arbitrator with equal diligence, they will end up with the average arbitrator on the initial list of
randomly assigned arbitrators.”); Scot Bernstein, Tampering with List Selection by Enhancing the
Appointment Frequency of “Chair-Qualified” Arbitrators, 13 PIABA BAR J. 13, 15 (2006) (“[A]s a
practical matter, the arbitrators who serve most frequently will be those who have succeeded in
keeping their balance of customer victories and customer losses reasonably close to the 50-50
mark . . . . Issuing split-the-baby awards may help those arbitrators as well.”).
230. FINRA new case filings tend to decrease in times when the stock market is performing well,
as was true in the period of 2010 through the present. See, e.g., Laura Sanicola, FINRA Arbitration
Cases Are Down, but the Rest of the Year May Tell Another Story, INVESTMENTNEWS (Dec. 16, 2015),
https://www.investmentnews.com/finra-arbitration-cases-are-down-but-the-rest-of-the-year-maytell-another-story-65067 [perma.cc/KZ2N-SVKF] (reporting that a FINRA spokesperson stated that
FINRA filings “are countercyclical to the stock market,” and that “[i]f the market goes down
substantially, historically, we have seen a rise in case filings”); Liz Knueven, The Average Stock
Market Return over the Past 10 Years, BUS. INSIDER (June 14, 2021, 7:40 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/personal-finance/average-stock-market-return [https://perma.cc/
L5KP-XDMW] (“[T]he S&P 500 has done slightly better than the historic 10-year average, with an
annual average return of 13.6% in the past 10 years.”).
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experience needed to qualify as a chair.231 If a new entrant is chosen to
serve on a panel and the proceeding does not settle, it then takes on
average sixteen to seventeen months for that matter to conclude after a
hearing, with the result that even appointment to a proceeding that
proceeds to an award means a significant time commitment before the
experiential qualification is satisfied.232 Second, this arbitrator would need
to be an attorney who is currently licensed in one jurisdiction, or, if not an
attorney, they would need to repeat their success in serving as an arbitrator
on an additional two arbitrations, for a minimal total of three arbitrations
concluding in an award after a hearing.233 Finally, the arbitrator would
have to complete FINRA’s training to serve as a public chair,234 a
requirement for public chair service that FINRA reports is not completed
by many public arbitrators who otherwise qualify to serve as chairs.235
Public arbitrators can also, counterintuitively, meet the experience
qualification to serve as a public chair through arbitrator service on
industry claims in addition to or instead of service on customer cases
because FINRA requires experience in a self-regulatory organization
overseen by arbitration in which a hearing is held and does not require
service only in FINRA customer cases.236 The public chair experiential
231. Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Amending Code of Arbitration Procedure for
Customer Disputes and Industry Disputes Relating to Broadening Chairperson Eligibility, Exchange
Act Release No. 78,729, 81 Fed. Reg. 61,288 (Sept. 6, 2016) (“FINRA has had limited success in
enrolling new public chairpersons. One reason is that for the last few years, FINRA’s arbitration
caseload has remained low, and public arbitrators were not serving on a sufficient number of cases
through award to meet the case experience requirements for attorney arbitrators outlined above.”).
Indeed, the difficulty obtaining experience to serve as a chair was so significant that FINRA proposed
a rule change in 2016 to reduce the experiential requirement for licensed attorneys from two hearings
to one hearing. See id. (rule proposal); Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Amending Code of
Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes and Industry Disputes Relating to Broadening
Chairperson Eligibility, Exchange Act Release No. 79455, 81 Fed. Reg. 88,720 (Dec. 8, 2016)
(approving rule change).
232. See 2020 Dispute Resolution Statistics, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/arbitrationmediation/dispute-resolution-statistics/2020 [https://perma.cc/AMQ9-BY74] (showing that average
turnaround time for cases in which there was a regular hearing in 2019 was 16.9 months, and 16.5
months in 2018). This statistic only includes cases decided by an arbitrator that conclude via a regular
hearing. Id. There are separate statistics for the two simplified hearing options—telephonic and on
the papers. Id. Those hearings are overseen by a chair-qualified arbitrator. FINRA, Rule 12400
(2020). All hearing statistics—whether overseen by one or three arbitrators—are reported together.
Cf. Dispute Resolution Statistics, supra (listing disposition of cases by hearing type and collecting
data for hearing, special proceeding, or paper types).
233. FINRA, RULE 12400(c) (2020).
234. Id.
235. Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Amending Code of Arbitration Procedure for
Customer and Industry Disputes Relating to Broadening Chairperson Eligibility, Exchange Act
Release No. 78,729, 81 Fed. Reg. 61,288 (Sept. 6, 2016) (“FINRA has had limited success in enrolling
new public chairpersons.”).
236. FINRA, RULE 12400(c) (2020).
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qualification requires only that a public arbitrator sit on SRO-led
arbitrations that conclude in an award after a hearing.237 FINRA, for
example, is an SRO with more than one arbitral forum—one for the
resolution of customer claims and another for the resolution of claims
between industry actors.238 Because the experiential requirement for
public chair qualification does not require experience in a customer case
per se, it is possible that a public arbitrator may become a chair without
ever having experienced a customer’s case. This is because public
arbitrators do not only decide FINRA customer disputes; they are also
tapped to decide intra-industry disputes.239 In a dispute between a
stockbroker and a broker-dealer firm (or between two stockbrokers or
brokerage firms), public arbitrators are chosen to serve much in the same
way they serve in customer cases.240 Thus, a public, chair-qualified
arbitrator oversees and decides a dispute involving a stockbroker and
another industry member seeking $100,000 or less.241 In a case involving
greater than $100,000 between a stockbroker and another industry
member, the proceeding will be decided by one public chair, a non-public
arbitrator, and a public arbitrator.242 As a result, it is entirely possible that
a public arbitrator may obtain the experiential qualification to serve as a
chair by only hearing disputes within the industry and dominated by
industry perspectives.243
Though few FINRA arbitration proceedings—industry or customer—
conclude with an award on the merits, one type of request for relief cannot
conclude without an arbitrator’s award after a hearing: expungement.244
An expungement proceeding in arbitration is the first step a stockbroker
takes towards removing information like a customer complaint from their
disciplinary record, portions of which are available to the public via
237. Id.
238. See FINRA, RULE 12000 (2007) (Customer Code); id. 12101(a) (2008) (“The [Customer]
Code applies to any dispute between a customer and a member or associated person of a member that
is submitted to arbitration under Rule 12200 or 12201.”); id. 13000 (2007) (Industry Code); id.
13200(a) (2008) (requiring arbitration of disputes “between or among Members; Members and
Associated Persons; or Associated Persons”).
239. See FINRA, RULE 13406(b) (2017).
240. Id.
241. Regulatory Notice 09-43: SEC Approves Amendments to the Panel Composition Rules of the
Arbitration Code for Industry Disputes, FINRA (Aug. 31, 2009), https://www.finra.org/rulesguidance/notices/09-43 [https://perma.cc/32PB-L2VP].
242. Id.
243. FINRA, RULE 12400(c) (2020).
244. See id. 2080 (2009) (obtaining an order of expungement); id. 12805 (2009) (expungement in
customer cases); id. 13805 (2009) (expungement brought as an industry proceeding). See generally
Christine Lazaro, Has Expungement Broken BrokerCheck?, 14 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 123, 129–34 (2014)
(describing expungement generally).
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FINRA’s BrokerCheck tool.245 Stockbrokers can seek expungements in
either industry or customer arbitration proceedings, and public arbitrators
are among the neutrals who issue awards in these claims.246 Expungement
claims forming the basis of industry arbitration claims have risen
dramatically in recent years, with some reporting a 900% increase.247
Stockbrokers often include a request for expungement in their response to
a customer’s arbitration, and an award document in a customer case often
details the results of the expungement hearing in proceedings where the
underlying customer claim settled, was dismissed, or was voluntarily
withdrawn.248 Arbitrators may only recommend the expungement of
customer dispute data on three grounds: (1) “the claim, allegation or
information is factually impossible or clearly erroneous;” (2) the
stockbroker “was not involved in the alleged investment-related sales
practice violation, forgery, theft, misappropriation or conversion of
funds;” or (3) “the claim, allegation or information is false.”249
Expungement is thus meant to be an extraordinary device to remove
incorrect information from the regulatory record.250
Despite this seemingly high bar, expungements are granted in a

245. Honigsberg & Jacob, supra note 229, at 801 (stating that expungement “allows brokers to
remove select allegations of misconduct through an arbitration process”); Lazaro, supra note 244, at
124–33 (describing Central Registration Depository, BrokerCheck, and purpose of expungement).
246. FINRA, RULE 12805 (2009) (customer); id. 13805 (2009) (industry); id. 12400 (2020)
(customer); id. 13400 (2007) (industry).
247. See Benjamin P. Edwards, Do Non-Adversarial Arbitrations Bias Arbitrators Over Time?,
BUS. L. PROF BLOG (Aug. 27, 2020), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2020/08/donon-adversarial-arbitrations-bias-arbitrators-over-time.html
[https://perma.cc/G7XL-WX7A]
(“These expungement-only arbitrations have been rapidly increasing in volume. The PIABA
Foundation found an over 900% increase in these cases from 2015 to 2018.”). Expungement claims
have been rising at this pace due to a recent FINRA rule change that increased the cost of obtaining
an expungement. See, e.g., Mark Schoeff, Jr., SEC Approves FINRA Rule Setting Minimum Fee for
Expungement Requests, INVESTMENTNEWS (June 10, 2020), https://www.investmentnews.com/secapproves-finra-rule-set-minimum-fee-expungement-requests-193912
[https://perma.cc/CKD5YF8E] (describing FINRA rulemaking and the “$1 trick” elimination with concurrent increase of
expungement filing costs to approximately $8,300).
248. See, e.g., Alexander & Iannarone, supra note 25, at 1731 fig.5 (describing frequency of top
100 terms appearing in customer cases concluding with an award in five year period between May 1,
2013 and May 1, 2018 and including “expungement”); Karsch v. Stanley, No. 19-00628, 2021 WL
4910243, at *3 (FINRA Oct. 13, 2021) (Gallagher, Jaffe & Cini, Arbs.) (documenting award in
customer case where underlying claims settled and hearing only related to expungement).
249. FINRA, RULE 2080(b) (2009).
250. See id.; Frequently Asked Questions About FINRA Rule 2080 (Expungement), FINRA,
https://www.finra.org/registration-exams-ce/classic-crd/faq/finra-rule-2080-frequently-askedquestions [https://perma.cc/JU9B-5H27] (“FINRA recognizes that expungement of a CRD record
under any circumstances is an extraordinary remedy and should be used only when the expunged
information has no meaningful regulatory or investor protection value.”).
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substantial percentage of customer cases.251 FINRA’s chair qualification
standards require only that the arbitrator serve in a proceeding that
resolves via an award after a hearing, so theoretically at least, an
expungement proceeding would meet the experiential qualification for
subsequent chair service.252 Although FINRA does not count these
proceedings towards chair qualification, some public arbitrators may first
participate on a panel hearing a customer’s substantive claim after serving
in multiple cases where they are considering whether a customer claim
upon which a stockbroker or brokerage firm paid monetary damages is
false, factually impossible, or clearly erroneous.253 The impact that being
exposed to claims that customers are, in essence, lying about conduct that
results in a monetary payment to them, may inject bias into the pool of
arbitrators solely responsible for the adjudication of smaller customer
claims.254
Taken together, the expungement process and the possibility of
obtaining chair qualification by service on industry cases may mean that
while FINRA endeavored to create an arbitrator pool without ties to the
251. In a prior project, Professor Charlotte Alexander and I established through computational
textual analysis of FINRA customer awards that 41% of customer cases that concluded in an award
between May 1, 2013 and May 1, 2018 were the result of a hearing held after the customer settled the
underlying claims and reflected the panel’s decision as to whether a claim that the parties agreed to
resolve outside the arbitration process should be removed from the stockbroker’s record. Awards
reflecting the arbitrator’s decision on a stockbroker’s expungement claim in a customer case were
more prevalent than awards reflecting either a complete customer win or loss. See Alexander &
Iannarone, supra note 25, at 1732–33. Others have determined that expungements are recommended
from 80% to nearly 97% of the time. See, e.g., Honigsberg & Jacob, supra note 229, at 801 (“Of the
expungement requests that are adjudicated on the merits, over 80% are successful.”); PIABA,
EXPUNGEMENT STUDY OF THE PUBLIC INVESTORS ARBITRATION BAR ASSOCIATION 1 (2013),
https://piaba.org/system/files/2018-01/REPORT%20-%20Expungement%20Study%20of%20the
%20Public%20Investors%20Arbitration%20Bar%20Association.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9MK9KCL7]; Stockbroker Arbitration Slates Wiped Clean 9 Out of 10 Times, PIABA,
https://www.piaba.org/in-the-media/stockbroker-arbitration-slates-wiped-clean-9-out-10-times-0
[https://perma.cc/3CWD-BCXD] (“For the most recent time period[,] mid-May 2009 through the end
of 2011, expungement relief was granted in nearly every instance—96.9 percent of the cases resolved
by settlements or stipulated awards.”). As a point of comparison, FINRA reports that arbitrators award
consumers damages ranging from 28% to 45% of arbitration proceedings that conclude with an award
after a hearing between 2016 and 2021. See Dispute Resolution Statistics, supra note 222 (2016–2021
results).
252. FINRA, RULE 12400(c) (2020).
253. See also Edwards, supra note 247 (“Investors may fear that these arbitrators will see investors
as liars because they have been exposed to unopposed expungement hearing after unopposed
expungement hearing.”). Given the prevalence of expungement-only cases in which public arbitrators
participate, additional study is required to determine if these cases produce bias and whether
expungement claims are better heard by a separate pool of arbitrators to maintain the objectivity of
the public arbitrator pool.
254. Id. (describing potential bias-inducing aspects of expungement proceedings). Such an impact
may also be magnified in cases where the same counsel represents stockbrokers seeking expungement
and subsequently defends stockbrokers in customer-initiated arbitration proceedings.
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industry, its arbitrator qualification rules undermine that initial goal in the
smaller claims deemed most important to ensuring investor trust in the
securities markets.255 Moreover, the 2007 amendments setting forth chair
experience and education criteria decrease the pool from which customers
in smaller claims can expect to draw from for their claims, a result that
FINRA predicted before the rule went into effect.256 This potential
impact—the lessened ability of consumers to benefit from more
representative, truly public, and newer arbitrators hearing their smaller
claims—directly conflicts with FINRA’s diversification goals. Whether
the experiential qualification for public chair service is in fact a bar to
newer entrants to the FINRA arbitral pool is subject to empirical
measurement, which will be undertaken in the next Part.
IV. STUDY METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS
The identification of structural barriers to diversity and inclusion in
FINRA’s arbitrator pool is itself enough to necessitate rulemaking to
remedy the costs of exclusion. In other arbitral forums, a project would
simply end there. FINRA’s transparency, however, provides a rare
opportunity to empirically evaluate the impact of arbitrator qualification
and selection rules on inclusion, benefitting both the participants in the
FINRA forum and building a roadmap for assessing the efficacy of
diversity and inclusion measures undertaken by any arbitral forum.

255. See DOSS & FRANKOWSKI, supra note 184, at 122 (“The rationale for having the chairperson
roster is to ensure that at least one of the arbitrators on a panel has experience in procedural and
substantive issues that arise in arbitration proceedings. On the other hand, the eligibility requirements
of the rule dictate that the chair-qualified arbitrator serve on multiple arbitration cases, which as a
practical matter could discourage those arbitrators from making ruling that would expose them to risk
of being stricken in future cases.”).
256. Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change and Amendment Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 Thereto to
Amend NASD Arbitration Rules for Customer Disputes, Exchange Act Release No. 51,856, 70 Fed.
Reg. 36,442 (June 15, 2005); see also Bernstein, supra note 229, at 15 n.6 (“NASD believes that the
requirement that an arbitrator serve on at least three arbitrations through award to be eligible for the
chair roster is an objective standard that is easily measured. While this standard is easy to measure, it
is not easy to meet. Of the arbitration cases filed in the past four years, approximately 22% went to
hearing.”); id. at 27–28 (predicting two to three times greater chance of public chair arbitrators
appearing on lists in three arbitrator cases). Indeed, FINRA reworked the experiential requirement for
attorney public arbitrators as a result of the difficulty in obtaining the requisite experience as stated
in the 2007 rule change. Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Amending Code of Arbitration
Procedure for Customer Disputes and Industry Disputes Relating to Broadening Chairperson
Eligibility, Exchange Act Release No. 78,729, 81 Fed. Reg. 61,288 (Sept. 6, 2016) (reducing number
of hearings through award that a licensed lawyer public arbitrator must complete from two to one to
obtain experiential requirement for public chair qualification).
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Hypothesis and Study Design

The empirical study was designed to assess the extent to which post
2014 arbitrator entrants presided as the sole public-chair arbitrator on a
smaller claim brought by a customer. The hypothesis is that as a result of
structural barriers to service as a public chairperson in a single arbitrator
customer case, few of the arbitrators who joined after 2014, who are on
the whole more diverse than members of the pre-2015 arbitrator pool,257
would have decided contested proceedings brought by customers whose
claims were below $100,000. The study focuses on this metric due to the
specific public protection and market trust functions of smaller claims
arbitration coupled with the greater likelihood of a customer with a
smaller claim being a member of an underrepresented group, suggesting
that increasing inclusion of new arbitrator entrants is necessary to satisfy
the investor protection and market trust aims of securities arbitration.258
The project began with a bulk download of all publicly available
FINRA arbitration awards from its Awards Database through December
2019.259 FINRA Dispute Resolution Services hears cases related to both
intra-industry and customer versus industry disputes.260 All awards were
reviewed to classify by case type and exclude intra-industry claims.261 The
data were limited to the study time period of investor claims filed between
January 1, 2015 through December 31, 2019.262 The awards were then
classified by the type of panel that decided the claim, either a one or three

257. See, e.g., Our Commitment, supra note 15 (noting that women joining roster in 2018–2019
comprised 39% of new entrants versus 23% women on overall roster in 2015); id. (Black arbitrators
constituting 19% of entrants in 2018–2019 versus 4% of overall arbitrator pool in 2015); see also
supra Part II.
258. The author anticipates future study of new arbitrator entrant appearance in three-arbitrator
cases to further study the impact of barriers to inclusion in those claims.
259. Arbitration Awards Online, supra note 31 (“FINRA’s Arbitration Awards database enables
users to perform Web-based searches for FINRA and historical NASD arbitration awards free of
charge, seven days a week.”).
260. Code of Arbitration Procedure, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/arbitration-mediation/codearbitration-procedure [https://perma.cc/ZU44-MRA9] (describing customer and industry codes, the
claims that they govern, and providing links to each).
261. The case type was determined by reviewing metadata associated with each file wherein the
classification of the case was noted or, where metadata were not available, manually reviewing and
coding each award.
262. Metadata associated with each case indicates the year in which it was filed. Moreover,
FINRA’s case naming convention begins with the last two digits of the year in which the case was
filed followed by a dash and a series of numbers denoting which number the case is of all cases filed
within that year. Note, however, that not all cases filed between 2014 and 2019 had been fully
adjudicated before the conclusion of 2019.
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arbitrator panel.263 The final data set included 715 awards in cases decided
by one arbitrator that were filed between January 1, 2015 and December
31, 2019.
The individual awards within the study set were hand reviewed to code
information including the identity of the arbitrator, the type of hearing,
the damages requested and awarded, if applicable, how the investor
claimant was represented, and the outcome of the proceeding. The
arbitrator name coding was then hand reviewed to identify the unique
arbitrators appearing within the data set and calculate the frequency with
which they appeared in the data set. Each unique arbitrator’s name was
then used as a search term within FINRA’s awards database to identify
the earliest available arbitration case upon which the arbitrator served
through hearing.264 This date very conservatively serves as a proxy for
whether the given arbitrator had been part of the arbitration pool prior to
FINRA’s 2015 recruitment efforts.265
B.

Results

The data include 715 total awards filed between January 1, 2015 and
December 31, 2019 that were decided by a single, public chair-qualified
arbitrator and resulted in a published award after a hearing. Four hundred
and fifty-one unique arbitrators appeared in the 715 total awards. Of those
unique arbitrators, seven, or 1.55%, were arbitrators who first appeared in
the FINRA awards database as an arbitrator after December 31, 2014.266
Of the overall arbitration cases that proceeded to an award, only 0.98%
were decided by public chair-qualified arbitrators who first appeared in
the awards database as an arbitrator in a case filed after December 31,
2014 (“New Arbitrators”).
Of these seven New Arbitrators, at least one likely joined the FINRA
263. Cases seeking $100,000 or less are decided by one arbitrator, and cases seeking in excess of
that amount are decided by three arbitrators. FINRA, RULE 12401 (2012). There are some claims
seeking greater than $100,000 determined by one arbitrator, including default proceedings and claims
where the parties agreed to resolution by a single, chair-qualified arbitrator. FINRA, RULE
12801(b)(2)(B) (2020) (single arbitrator appointed in default proceedings); id. 12105 (2008)
(permitting modification of some FINRA rules by agreement of the parties in writing).
264. This metric is an imperfect proxy for when an arbitrator joined FINRA’s arbitration pool and
likely understates how long an arbitrator has been registered as a FINRA arbitrator for the reasons
more fully described in supra sections III.B–C.
265. Id. The use of this metric as a proxy likely classifies arbitrators as post-2014 entrants to the
neutral roster even if they joined before that date due to the entry barriers previously discussed.
266. Several arbitrators either currently or previously appeared as counsel for industry or customer
parties, requiring a deeper analysis than simply searching for a name match. See, e.g., Campagna v.
Gary Goldberg & Co., Inc., No. 09-06683, 2011 WL 4054876, at *2 (FINRA Sept. 1, 2011) (Olney,
Gross & Chin, Arbs.) (listing Jill I. Gross as neutral); Harney v. Stone, No. 03-07962, 2004 WL
1907188, at *1 (Aug. 3, 2004) (listing Jill I. Gross as counsel for claimant).
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arbitrator pool before 2015 because that arbitrator’s first publicly
available award lists that arbitrator as the public-chair.267 The arbitrator’s
first service could not be as a public chair, so this arbitrator likely joined
the roster before 2015.268 None of the seven New Arbitrators appear more
than once in the data, showing that each decided exactly one customer
case. Five New Arbitrators first appeared in FINRA’s Awards Database
in 2015,269 one in 2016,270 and one in 2017.271 The data suggest that
virtually no customers in small cases whose case concluded via award
after a hearing benefitted from the increased diversity FINRA achieved in
the overall pool from 2015-2019. This also suggests that the aboveidentified barriers to public chair service are substantial.272
A review of the data also tells a striking story about the public chairs
who decided contested claims in single arbitrator customer cases over the
past five years: an extremely long tenure on the FINRA arbitration roster.
When collectively assessing the unique arbitrators in the dataset,
including New Arbitrators, the average year the proceeding in which they
first appeared in FINRA’s Awards Database was filed was 2000. In fact,
the study resulted in a finding that 238, or 52.6%, of the unique arbitrators
in the dataset first appeared in FINRA’s Awards Database in arbitration
cases filed before January 1, 2001, a tenure of nearly twenty years on the
FINRA arbitration roster.273
267. See, e.g., Iskander v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., No. 15-00448, 2017 WL 1406980, at *2
(FINRA Apr. 10, 2017) (Panossian-Bassler, O’Keefe & Mass, Arbs.) (industry case recommending
expungement of cause of associated person’s termination in which New Arbitrator serves as chair).
268. See supra Part III (discussing history of arbitrator qualification rules).
269. See Iskander, 2017 WL 1406980, at *2 (industry case recommending expungement of cause
of associated person’s termination in which New Arbitrator serves as chair); Sgrignoli v. Morgan
Stanley, No. 15-00681, 2016 WL 6663134, at *2 (FINRA Nov. 1, 2016) (Walker, Webb & Giblin,
Arbs.) (denying all of claimant’s claims for lack of causation and recommending expungement);
Cummings v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. of P.R., No. 15-00709, 2017 WL 1295415, at *4 (FINRA Mar.
29, 2017) (Healey, Lauziere & Ostrov, Arbs.) (awarding compensatory damages to claimant regarding
Puerto Rico bond product failure); Fernandez v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. of P.R., No. 15-02121, 2016
WL 7325667, at *2 (FINRA Dec. 9, 2016) (Potter, Warren & Duchesne, Arbs.) (awarding $375,726
of $4,700,000–$6,600,000 requested regarding Puerto Rico bond product failure); Caposino v. Euro
Pac. Cap., Inc., No. 15-00721, 2016 WL 6125018, at *3 (FINRA Oct. 13, 2016) (Haynes, Thornburg
& Kane, Arbs.) (denying all of claimant’s claims and recommending expungement).
270. See Treacy v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., No. 17-00188, 2018 WL 1211613, at *1–2 (FINRA
Feb. 26, 2018) (Miron, Antonelli & Grinsberg, Arbs.) (awarding compensatory damages of $300,000
to claimants who sought $338,417.03 in compensatory damages and recommending expungement
against associated person against whom claimants withdrew all claims during the hearing).
271. See Dancy v. Wedbush Sec. Inc., No. 16-00847, 2017 WL 3085489, at *2–3 (FINRA July 13,
2017) (Klein, Thomsen & Payne, Arbs.) (awarding full damages to claimants).
272. See supra section III.C.
273. This figure understates the length of time an arbitrator has appeared on the FINRA roster
because it relates to first date of service and not first date of availability. Moreover, for the reasons
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Evaluating the results in tandem with effective dates of FINRA rule
changes identified as potential barriers preventing new entrants from
deciding smaller customers’ claims provides additional information.
Nearly all arbitrators in the data first appeared in the FINRA Awards
Database as panelists on cases filed before any prior experience or
specialized education was required for chair service.274 Indeed, 368 of the
unique arbitrators, or 81.6%, first appeared in the FINRA Awards
Database in a claim filed before FINRA changed the rules to restrict
service on single arbitrator cases to public chairs with experiential and
educational requirements.275 Only one of the unique arbitrators, who also
happens to be a New Arbitrator, first appeared in the FINRA Awards
Database in a case filed after FINRA revised its public chair qualifications
to reduce from two to one the number of arbitrations a lawyer arbitrator
must participate in to meet the experiential requirement for subsequent
chair service.276 Moreover, 166, or 36.8%, of the unique arbitrators first
appeared in cases filed before 1998, meaning that they were appointed by
FINRA to serve on a proceeding before the parties had the ability to
participate in arbitrator selection.277
To put it another way, the study illustrates that over one-third of the
unique arbitrators in one-arbitrator cases filed between 2014 and 2019
were decided by arbitrators who obtained experience before the parties
had a say in arbitrator selection and over four-fifths served before chairs

described in Part III, a significant number of claims that conclude in a final award are expunged from
associated persons’ CRD records. See supra section III.C. Expungement thus may serve to remove
information from the public record. Settled cases with repeat players may magnify an informational
asymmetry between consumers and broker dealers as broker dealers maintain knowledge of an
arbitrator’s service on a settled case and any actions taken before the case was settled while the public
consumer has no access to that information because it is not included as part of FINRA’s public
record.
274. See supra note 256 and accompanying text (describing 2007 FINRA rule change requiring
experiential and education requirement for public chair service and 2017 rule change reducing
experiential requirement for attorney arbitrators due to difficulty of obtaining requisite experience).
275. See id.
276. Treacy, 2018 WL 1211613, at *1–2 (awarding compensatory damages of $300,000 to
claimants who sought $338,417.03 in compensatory damages and recommending expungement
against associated person against whom claimants withdrew all claims during the hearing). It is not
clear from the award whether the New Arbitrator, Howard Alan Grinsberg, is an attorney or not. He
appears to serve as an arbitrator for both the Newark and New York City hearing locations, potentially
increasing his probability of being selected for service. Id. at *1 (listing Grinsberg as arbitrator in
hearing located in Newark, NJ); Paul Steven Lindemann v. J.P. Morgan Sec., LLC, No. 20-03916,
2021 WL 5039762, at *1 (FINRA Oct. 21, 2021) (Grinsberg, Arb.) (listing Grinsberg as arbitrator in
hearing located in New York, NY).
277. See supra section III.A (describing pre-1998 FINRA rules mandating that the neutral(s) be
selected by the Director of Arbitration).
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presided over panels.278 These results may suggest that any protection
potentially emanating from chair qualification is not particularly valued
by repeat players. Similarly, it appears that chair qualification standards
are indeed a substantial bar for new arbitrators to overcome, and
customers with smaller claims are unlikely to have their claims decided
by newer entrants to FINRA’s arbitration roster, raising questions as to
whether FINRA’s diversification efforts have resulted in inclusion in
smaller claims cases.279
C.

Limitations and Open Questions

The data are incomplete and cannot paint a full picture of new arbitrator
entrants’ experiences in FINRA arbitration. While FINRA releases more
information about its mandatory securities arbitration forum than most
consumer arbitration forums, FINRA’s transparency has limits.280 FINRA
maintains data that are not publicly available, some of which are available
to arbitration participants and other that are not. FINRA releases to the
parties and their counsel the education, employment background, and
cases assigned to an arbitrator appearing on a selection list, information
that may be aggregated by repeat players for their benefit.281 Parties in
cases that resolve via settlement or the claimant’s voluntary dismissal are
not publicly reported, but the parties involved are aware of who the
arbitrator was and may have had impressions of and interactions with that
neutral. FINRA maintains additional information in aggregate form that
is not publicly available, including the identities of all arbitrators on the
roster, when they joined the roster, whether they are an attorney, their

278. See supra notes 274–277 and accompanying text.
279. The study did not investigate whether new entrants obtained the experiential qualification and
presided over three-arbitrator panels as chairs during the study period because of the focus on smaller
investor’s claims given their specific role in creating trust and confidence in the securities markets
and the likelihood that claimants with smaller claims are themselves most likely to be members of
underrepresented groups. While it may be possible that investors with claims over $100,000 have
obtained some benefit of a more diversified public chair arbitrator pool post-2014, this question—and
the impact of the most resourced investors potentially having access to the most diverse arbitrator
pool—will be addressed in subsequent research by the author.
280. Iannarone, Finding Light, supra note 13, at 6–7. But see Edwards, supra note 76, at 432.
281. Iannarone, Finding Light, supra note 13, at 6–7. During the arbitrator selection process,
FINRA provides detailed information, contained on an Arbitrator Disclosure Report, to the parties in
the proceeding to assist them in their selection. FINRA, RULE 12402(c)(1) (2017) (stating that along
with list generated by NLSS in one arbitrator cases, “parties will also receive employment history for
the past 10 years and other background information for each arbitrator listed”); see also Sample
Arbitrator Disclosure Report, supra note 30 (providing background information not otherwise
publicly available to parties engaged in arbitrator selection, including cases currently assigned to
arbitrator involving public customers or members of industry that may subsequently conclude without
an award).
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chair-qualification status, the cases where they have been appointed to
serve, and every case they have decided (whether or not it was
subsequently expunged). There is no question that the examination of
such data would provide a more robust analysis of the experience of new
entrants to FINRA’s arbitrator pool.282
Despite the data limitations, however, a study of incomplete public data
fulfills an important function.283 Doing so makes it possible to ascertain
what knowledge, if any, consumer investors can obtain from the only
sources available to them. Indeed, the data comprise information that
FINRA advises customers to search before they select a stockbroker,284
and it is the information FINRA touts as part of its transparency in the
arbitration sphere setting itself apart from other arbitral forums.285
Studying this inherently limited data elucidates FINRA’s claims that it
believes in transparency and is transparent, showing both what the
information FINRA provides signals to the public and the extent to which
the data’s limitations make reliance on conclusions drawn there from
difficult.
Should FINRA wish to correct what it believes to be misperceptions
because incomplete data were all that is publicly available, it should
publicly provide the data from which a complete study can be undertaken
to eliminate informational asymmetries and make the data available to the
constituents it is intended to serve: consumer investors required to
arbitrate in its mandatory forum. Such data transparency may also benefit
consumers required to arbitrate in other forums if subsequent FINRA
transparency nudges those forums towards greater transparency as to
diversity and inclusion in their own arbitrator pools. The current data in
the most transparent mandatory forum suggest, however, that five years
after FINRA took significant steps to, and did, diversify its arbitrator
roster, customer claimants in smaller cases are not obtaining the benefit
of those efforts. Providing additional data may permit study of the reasons
why newer arbitrators are not serving as chairs in smaller claims.

282. At the same time, however, there is some information related to an arbitrator’s diversity
statuses that, if disclosed, could have the unintended consequence of resulting in the arbitrator being
selected less often due to an impermissible bias leading a party to strike the arbitrator based solely
upon the basis of that bias.
283. Iannarone, Finding Light, supra note 13, at 11–12.
284. Id. at 4–5.
285. FINRA, DISCUSSION PAPER—FINRA PERSPECTIVES ON CUSTOMER RECOVERY 3 (2018),
https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/finra_perspectives_on_customer_recovery.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KAK3-KKMV] (illustrating FINRA securities arbitration award transparency
included in same category as court for metric of “Awards or Judgments Publicly Available”).
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INCREASING INCLUSION IN THE SMALLER CLAIMS
ARBITRATOR POOL

The study indicates that new arbitrators face hurdles before they can
preside over smaller claims. As noted above, however, the incomplete
publicly available information and the study’s focus on investors with
smaller claims makes it impossible to fully evaluate the impact of
FINRA’s efforts to diversify its pool.286 Accordingly, as FINRA—and
other forums—assess diversity and inclusion efforts, it is essential both
that they increase transparency while also working to dismantle barriers
that may hinder progress. This Part addresses these tandem interventions
to enable full realization of FINRA’s diversity and inclusion aims in its
Dispute Resolution space.
A.

Increasing Transparency

Transparency plays an important role in FINRA arbitration
proceedings, bolstering the legitimacy of the forum by providing
information from which investors can determine that if they have a dispute
with a stockbroker, it will be fairly resolved.287 This legitimacy in turn
supports consumer trust in the securities markets.288 FINRA’s decision to
publicly release all awards in every arbitration that leads to an award
provides an extremely deep and rich pool for evaluating the impact of its
recruitment of new and more diverse arbitrators.289 Despite FINRA’s
commitment to transparency concerning arbitrator pool diversity,290 the
decision to limit publicly available information to only final decisions
rendered by arbitrators and aggregate diversity statistics related to the
overall pool makes it challenging to assess whether and to what extent
new arbitrators are being offered the opportunity to serve, are chosen to
serve, and are able to obtain chair qualification and preside over smaller
claims.291 Publicly providing additional transparency—releasing
additional categories of information—will permit assessment of the

286. See, e.g., Volpe, supra note 125, at 206 (“Research is needed to amass more extensive and
systematic data about all aspects of dispute resolution processes and practices, a state of affairs that
has been a longstanding concern of the dispute resolution field.”); id. at 206–08 (calling for greater
transparency of ADR professional backgrounds to study diversity).
287. See supra Part I.
288. Id.
289. See Arbitration Awards Online, supra note 31; FINRA, RULE 12904(e) (2018) (listing
information contained in award document).
290. Our Commitment, supra note 15 (“In sharing the findings [of the arbitrator demographic
studies], FINRA strives to provide transparency about the current makeup of our arbitrator roster.”).
291. See supra section IV.C.

Iannarone07 - Iannarone_Ready for Publisher (Do Not Delete)

2021]

INCLUSION IN ARBITRATOR POOLS

12/14/2021 9:52 PM

1441

impact of diversification efforts.292 It will also permit the identification of
potential barriers to greater inclusion embedded within FINRA rules
and/or party action in arbitration selection as the source of new entrant
exclusion.293 In addition, the transparency will assist in efforts to cultivate
the investing public’s trust while illustrating the extent of FINRA’s
commitment to true inclusion.294
1.

Award Transparency

As an initial matter, FINRA should reconsider the transparency of its
award documents. FINRA’s current level of transparency in making
publicly available all awards rendered in its jurisdiction exceeds that of
other arbitral forums.295 That does not mean, however, that awards can be
used to fully assess whether arbitrators of diverse backgrounds are
selected to preside over cases.296 Arbitration cases that settle are not
recorded via an award, despite the fact that the settlement amount may be
required to be reported to the public via an individual broker’s profile in
the BrokerCheck database.297 BrokerCheck disclosures are intended to
permit the public to determine a host of information concerning
complaints against the stockbroker, including the general nature of the
claim and settlement amount, in contrast to other forums—including

292. Mistry, supra note 83 (“Major ADR players should continue tracking, publishing, and
considering diversity-related statistics.”).
293. Id. (arguing ADR forums “should also make the panel selection process as transparent as
possible” because “[i]ncreasing transparency in the arbitrator selection process allows claimants to
better consider diversity in their selection”).
294. Professor Sarah Rudolph Cole has advocated for increased transparency about arbitrators to
be maintained outside the arbitral forum. See Cole, Arbitrator Diversity, supra note 1, at 991–92
(arguing for increased information about arbitrators to be provided not by arbitration forums but
instead by individual arbitrators and non-forum affiliated aggregation sites). Cole’s proposal would
eliminate informational asymmetries currently existing between repeat players and unrepresented lay
persons and even the playing field between such parties if FINRA does not increase its own
transparency. See supra sections III.B–C (describing information used in arbitrator selection process
by repeat players that is unavailable to public or infrequent participants in the forum). In addition,
such externally maintained transparency would permit a greater range of information to be available
to all FINRA arbitration constituents, including evaluation of the parties’ experiences and feedback
that would not be released by an arbitral forum. See Cole, Arbitrator Diversity, supra note 1, at 991–
92 (describing potential for parties to share information concerning their experiences with specific
arbitrators).
295. See supra section II.B (comparing and contrasting transparency levels of FINRA, AAA, and
JAMS).
296. See supra section IV.C (describing limitations of empirical study).
297. See, e.g., FINRA, RULE 4530(a)(1) (2020) (reporting requirements for customer disputes); see
also Iannarone, Finding Light, supra note 13, at 3–5 (describing information reported on BrokerCheck
resulting from settlement of arbitration claims).
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court—where settlement amounts are kept secret.298 Because this
regulatory information is already available to parties, albeit in an
abbreviated form, there is not a confidentiality concern to exclude it from
a database of publicly available awards.
FINRA should expand its award transparency by requiring a public
award document when a case closes either by (1) settlement or
(2) arbitrator decision. Increasing transparency by providing award
documents related to settlements in addition to fully adjudicated
proceedings would provide the public with greater access to information
that is already available on BrokerCheck, while making it easier to assess
that information in context.299 Reframing award requirements to mandate
written awards when a claim settles would also permit all potentially
interested persons300—not just the parties to that proceeding—to have full
knowledge of the types of claims an arbitrator had previously participated
in, the parties and representatives with whom the arbitrator had previously
interacted, and how often the arbitrator had been chosen to serve but was
unable to earn an experiential credit because the claim settled. Broadly
reframing awards would also provide the transparency necessary to
alleviate the limitations to the study detailed in this Article.301
Accordingly, FINRA should expand the types of claims required to be
documented via an award to buttress public trust and confidence in its
arbitration forum.
2.

Arbitrator Pool Transparency

Another limitation to fully accessing FINRA’s diversity and inclusion
efforts is its selective distribution of arbitrator disclosure reports only to
parties in a filed arbitration. Disclosure reports should be both more
widely available and revised to contain all information concerning an
arbitrator’s inclusion on a list or selection in a proceeding, whether settled
or concluded via an award. This transparency intervention requires two
changes: (1) adding currently missing categories of information to
FINRA’s arbitrator disclosure reports; and (2) creating a publicly
accessible database through which disclosure reports are available and
searchable.
298. About BrokerCheck, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/investors/learn-to-invest/choosinginvestment-professional/about-brokercheck [https://perma.cc/86L7-SQ3X].
299. See, e.g., id. (“FINRA provides the following two databases as supplements to BrokerCheck:
FINRA Arbitration Awards Online . . . [and] FINRA Disciplinary Actions Online . . . .”).
300. For example, this information may be of interest to regulators and scholars studying the impact
of FINRA rules, the investing public as they decide whether to invest, and parties to future disputes
who are faced with decisions about how to rank and strike arbitrators.
301. See supra section IV.C (describing limitations of study).

Iannarone07 - Iannarone_Ready for Publisher (Do Not Delete)

2021]
a.

12/14/2021 9:52 PM

INCLUSION IN ARBITRATOR POOLS

1443

Expanding Information Included on Arbitrator Reports

Parties receive substantial information about individual arbitrators on
the comprehensive arbitrator disclosure reports they receive during the
arbitrator selection phase of a proceeding.302 On each arbitrator’s report is
a listing of the current cases upon which they serve as an arbitrator and
the cases in which they served where an award was rendered.303 At
present, these reports do not retain a historical record of all the cases upon
which the arbitrator was appointed.304 Instead, they only list the cases that
were decided by the arbitrators after a hearing.305 Thus, if an arbitrator
participated in pre-hearing conferences, discovery conferences, or issued
other orders and the case settled, an informational asymmetry exists.
Repeat players who were parties to that dispute have access to the
arbitrator’s pre-settlement actions in making their arbitrator selection
decisions, but the general public does not.306 This presents multiple
concerns that can be alleviated if FINRA expanded its arbitrator
disclosure reports to list all cases upon which an arbitrator had been
selected to serve and the disposition of that case.
First, were FINRA to capture the historical data of proceedings upon
which an arbitrator was appointed but did not render a decision along with
the current information contained on the arbitrator disclosure report, that
transparency would permit a more robust study of barriers to chair
qualification. In particular, researchers could study whether the failure to
obtain chair experience is tied to the experiential requirements for chair
service or party behavior. For example, it would be possible to determine
if the chair qualification experiential requirement is too stringent if it is
seen that arbitrators are appointed to—and engage in significant service—
on matters before they ultimately settle. It would also permit researchers
to study party behavior and bias with regard to particular arbitrators. Thus,
if an arbitrator is often appointed but all cases to which the arbitrator is
appointed with the same claimant or respondent settle, it may be the case
that that party’s representative believes the arbitrator would render an
award adverse to the party. Similarly, party behavior in settling cases
before they reach award may be determined to be strategic to avoid
permitting a certain arbitrator from gaining the experience to qualify for
302. Arbitrator Disclosure, supra note 30 (describing arbitrator disclosure reports “provided to
parties to help them make informed decisions during the arbitrator selection process”); Sample
Arbitrator Disclosure Report, supra note 30.
303. Sample Arbitrator Disclosure Report, supra note 30.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
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chair service.
Second, such disclosure would eliminate information asymmetries
between repeat players and less resourced parties who do not have
experience in the forum or connection with those who do.307 That is
particularly so if FINRA were also to maintain on each arbitrator’s
disclosure report the number of times the arbitrator’s name appeared on a
list and the total number of times the arbitrator has been appointed to a
proceeding that resolved without an award. For example, a claimant who
files an arbitration claim against a repeat-player respondent is at a
significant disadvantage in the arbitrator selection process because the
repeat-player respondent knows how their prior arbitrator ruled on
prehearing matters in a settled case.308 Eliminating this informational
asymmetry would increase consumer trust in the fairness of the FINRA
forum.
b.

Expanding Accessibility of Arbitrator Disclosure Reports

No matter the information included on an arbitrator disclosure report,
if that information is not equally accessible by all constituents, it is not
transparent. At present time, the only constituents who receive arbitrator
disclosure reports are parties to a pending proceeding. This system
privileges repeat players—typically respondents and lawyers who
represent claimants and respondents repeatedly in the forum. Such an
asymmetry in favor of repeat respondents and lawyers undermines the
perception of fairness in the forum. As an initial matter, investors may be
concerned that the system will not be fair to them when they are not able
to independently assess the available arbitrators as they are making a
decision as to which type of financial adviser they will retain. Such a result
undermines trust in FINRA arbitration as a fair mechanism for resolving
securities disputes. An additional layer of asymmetry appears for parties
who either appear pro se or retain counsel who is not experienced in the
forum. Repeat players and their counsel have institutional knowledge of
members of the arbitrator pool. This is especially a concern for investors
with smaller claims as scholars have noted that it is particularly difficult
for investors with claims under $100,000 to obtain counsel to represent
them in the forum.309 These investors should have access to the same
307. See supra section III.B (describing repeat player use of information received in prior
proceedings to assist in arbitrator selection).
308. See id. (describing party behavior and informational asymmetries in arbitrator selection).
309. See Nicole G. Iannarone, Assistant Clinical Professor & Dir., Ga. State Univ. Coll. of L. Inv.
Advoc. Clinic, Prepared Remarks at the Meeting of the Investor Advisory Committee (Oct. 12, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-2012/nicole-iannarone-remarks-iac101217.pdf [https://perma.cc/752J-DKJ8].
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information that experienced counsel and repeat players currently
maintain as institutional knowledge. Providing such information—in a
searchable form—would permit pro se parties and less experienced
counsel to close the information gap while permitting researchers and
other interested parties to evaluate inclusion in the arbitration forum.
Expanding the information available on arbitrator disclosure reports to
include all appointments—whether the claim settled or resolved via
award—and making these reports publicly available are transparencyincreasing interventions that would, taken together, assist audit of
FINRA’s diversity measures and eliminate informational asymmetries
that suggest unfair advantages to repeat players.310
3.

Location Transparency

FINRA should also provide information concerning the experiences of
arbitrators in each hearing location.311 There are significant differences
between the total number of arbitrators and cases in different hearing
locations.312 Yet FINRA’s current arbitrator pool diversity metrics only
reflect the entirety of the arbitrator pool.313 Comparing a new arbitrator’s
experience in Anchorage to another’s in New York may not, for many
reasons, be a fair comparison.314 New York and Anchorage are different
cities with different populations.315 Barriers and successes in achieving
equity and inclusion in each location may look very different.316
The current reporting only of the number of arbitrators by hearing
310. See, e.g., Katsoris, supra note 80, at 51 (“Unless such [securities arbitration] procedures are
fair in fact as well as in appearance, however, their popularity as a means of settling securities disputes
will greatly diminish, especially if the public is limited to applying these procedures to resolve their
disputes before only one self-regulating organization (SRO), FINRA.”).
311. Hearing Location Statistics, supra note 30.
312. Id. (listing number of cases, public chairs, public arbitrators, and non-public arbitrators by
hearing location).
313. See Our Commitment, supra note 15 (reporting national arbitrator pool diversity statistics).
314. For example, there are currently only six cases and one local public chair in Anchorage, AK,
compared to 589 cases and 152 local public chairs in New York, NY. Hearing Location Statistics,
supra note 30. 57.9% of persons in Anchorage identify as white persons who are not Hispanic/Latino
compared to 60.1% of New Yorkers. Compare Quick Facts: Anchorage Municipality, Alaska
(County), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 1, 2019), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/ancho
ragemunicipalityalaska,US/PST045219 [https://perma.cc/C796-EW7E], with Quick Facts: New York
City, New York, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 1, 2019), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/newyorkc
itynewyork. [https://perma.cc/332V-3HKY]. In New York, nearly 25% of citizens identify as Black
or African American persons versus nearly 6% in Anchorage. Quick Facts: New York City, New York,
supra; Quick Facts: Anchorage Municipality, Alaska (County), supra.
315. Quick Facts: New York City, New York, supra note 314; Quick Facts: Anchorage
Municipality, Alaska (County), supra note 314.
316. Quick Facts: New York City, New York, supra note 314; Quick Facts: Anchorage
Municipality, Alaska (County), supra note 314.
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location—and not arbitrator demographic information, when they joined
the roster, and the average time it takes to satisfy the experiential
requirement to serve as chair—makes it impossible for the public to
determine if FINRA’s diversity recruitment efforts have been successful
in any hearing location. Moreover, it is impossible to determine if certain
hearing locations are so homogeneous as to be entirely unfair to investors
because they lack representation.317 Providing information concerning the
diversity of the arbitrator pool associated with each hearing location will
assist in determining the impact of FINRA’s diversity recruitment
measures and whether the forum is fair to investors. Other forums
considering transparency as a diversity and inclusion approach should
similarly ensure that the data they provide permits evaluation of the
relevant hearing location.
Taken together, this triad of transparency interventions could play a
significant role in addressing the limitations identified by the study,
evaluating the impact of FINRA’s diversity recruitment initiative, and
promoting consumer trust in the forum.318 It is currently not possible to
evaluate, using publicly available information, whether the predicted
structural barriers319 are preventing newer arbitrators from gaining the
experiential qualification because chairs have a greater chance of
appearing in any arbitration. If information including when an arbitrator
first joined the pool, how many lists they had been named to, how many
cases they were appointed to serve upon that either settled or were
resolved via an award, and the hearing location they were assigned to were
available, it would be possible to ascertain whether FINRA rules or the
preferences or biases of the parties in the ranking and striking process
were contributing to the lack of appearance of new arbitrators.320 If
FINRA rules present barriers, they can be modified; and if the issue with
non-selection of new arbitrator entrants lies with the parties, further study
can be conducted to determine what is driving party reluctance to consider

317. Indeed, without information on arbitrator demographics by hearing location, FINRA may be
subject to challenge as a mandatory forum in the same fashion Jay-Z challenged the AAA. See Raagas
De Ramos, supra note 19.
318. See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 128, at 2 (describing impact lack of transparency has on
efforts to increase inclusion); id. at 7 (“[T]he confidentiality and privacy that are integral elements of
most dispute resolution processes reduce public awareness of the scope of the problem, most notably
awareness on the part of the stakeholders in the best position to bring about change—clients.”).
319. See supra section III.C (describing potential structural barriers to inclusion on FINRA’s
arbitrator pool).
320. See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 128, at 2 (“[Q]ualified diverse neutrals are less likely to be
selected due to the network-based and confidential nature of the profession, which in combination,
results in selection of neutrals taking place in relative obscurity, enabling implicit bias to play a greater
role in selection . . . .”).
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new entrants to the neutral roster and whether any of their actions are
premised on bias.321
B.

Rule Modifications to Increase Inclusion

Arbitration scholars have proposed major changes to arbitrator
selection and qualification rules to eliminate barriers to inclusion of
diverse arbitrators, suggestions that may also improve the FINRA
forum.322 Cole proposes revising arbitrator selection provisions and
creating permanent arbitrator panels to ensure the selection of an arbitrator
from a diverse arbitrator pool.323 La Rue and Symonette propose changes
to arbitrator selection by, among other things, guaranteeing a certain
percentage of arbitrators exhibiting diverse characteristics.324 Though
FINRA arbitration differs from many arbitral forums discussed in these
scholars’ work, structural interventions of this type would increase
inclusion in the FINRA forum. Specifically, as applied to FINRA’s
smaller claims cases, rule changes to promote inclusion could include
eliminating barriers that preference existing arbitrators, increasing
opportunities for new arbitrators to appear on lists and be selected, and
rethinking the public chair experiential qualification standard. These
potential changes can include eliminating the double selection preference
currently enjoyed by public, chair-qualified arbitrators, providing a
selection preference to guarantee a diverse non-chair list, and providing
alternate paths to chair qualification.
1.

Eliminating the Public Chair Qualified Arbitrator Preference

A barrier preventing new arbitrator entrants from opportunities to
appear on arbitrator slates, the double preference that chair-qualified
public arbitrators currently receive permitting them to be chosen for the
chair list and for non-chair public lists, should be reexamined.325 On the
one hand, public chair-qualified arbitrators have more experience than
321. Transparency is a focused intervention in this article given FINRA’s focus on transparency as
a means to ensure legitimacy within its forum. See Gross, The End of Mandatory Securities
Arbitration?, supra note 4. Should a forum wish to audit its diversity and inclusion metrics, it may
also do so by independent third-party audit without providing the underlying data to the public. While
such an intervention would assist the forum in evaluating its own efforts, a private audit lacks the trust
creation characteristics that full transparency provides. Professor Cole’s recommendation to provide
websites outside the arbitration forum with diversity and inclusion audit information may alleviate
these concerns. See Cole, Arbitrator Diversity, supra note 1.
322. See generally La Rue & Symonette, supra note 125; Cole, Arbitrator Diversity, supra note 1.
323. Cole, Arbitrator Diversity, supra note 1, at 985–90.
324. La Rue & Symonette, supra note 125 (describing potential application of Ray Corollary).
325. See supra section III.C and accompanying notes.
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non-chair qualified public arbitrators,326 and removing those not slated for
the public chair list from the potential pool of public arbitrators would
remove experienced arbitrators from consideration. On the other hand,
removing those arbitrators from consideration for the public, non-chair
list would free spaces for newer entrants to the arbitrator pool, increasing
their ability to obtain chair qualification and providing diversity of
decisionmakers in three arbitrator cases.327 Though it is currently not
possible to determine if the double chair preference is a barrier to newer
entrants being named on the public list or obtaining the experiential
requirements to serve as chairs in smaller claims, giving experienced
arbitrators more opportunities inevitably results in less opportunity for
new arbitrators. If FINRA’s focus is on ensuring that diverse arbitrators
are included, it should eliminate a barrier that limits their opportunity to
gain experience.
2.

Providing More Opportunities for Underrepresented Arbitrators to
Serve

FINRA should consider changing the manner in which its arbitrator
lists are populated to provide greater opportunities for diverse arbitrators
to serve. Such changes could be either voluntary, via agreement between
the parties, or mandated by FINRA. AAA, for example, permits parties to
arbitration agreements to opt into an arbitrator pool with at least one-third
diverse arbitrators.328 FINRA rules currently provide sufficient flexibility
for the parties to come to their own agreement—without any rule
changes—to craft an arbitrator list with their preselected percentage of
diverse arbitrators.329 A voluntary option for parties to FINRA
proceedings to elect a pool with certain threshold requirements would
permit financial services firms to meet the spirit of their recent public
statements in support of greater diversity and inclusion.330 Voluntary
options would also permit those investors who value diverse perspectives
to obtain them. Agreements to opt into a diverse list only work, however,

326. Id.
327. See Mistry, supra note 83 (“Increasing the pool of arbitrators may provide greater choice for
claimants, encourage better performance among ADR practitioners, and reduce the likelihood of
repeat appointments that may disadvantage inexperienced claimants.”).
328. Roster Diversity & Inclusion, supra note 17 (“The AAA has the ability in its algorithms to
provide arbitrator lists to parties that comprise at least 20% diverse panelists where party
qualifications are met.”).
329. See FINRA, RULE 12105(a) (2008) (“[I]f the Code provides that the parties may agree to
modify a provision of the Code, or a decision of the Director or the panel, the written agreement of
all named parties is required.”).
330. See supra section II.A.
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if all parties to the arbitration agree to deviate from the standard rules.331
Because party preference for the status quo often prevents lawyers from
taking risks and opting for new arbitrators or new procedures, it may be
necessary to make diverse arbitrator lists the norm rather than a voluntary
option.332 FINRA-wide reworking of arbitrator list selection could ensure
that, where the hearing location has sufficient arbitrator pool diversity, a
proportion of the public non-chair list would be filled with arbitrators
reflecting diverse characteristics, ensuring that the benefits of FINRA’s
diversification efforts flow to parties with smaller claims.333 Such changes
have been suggested by La Rue and Symonette as part of their Ray
Corollary Initiative.334 Specifically, FINRA could increase inclusion of
minority arbitrators by adopting that part of the Ray Corollary Initiative
“demonstrat[ing] that they have considered persons of color and
women—at least 30% of the candidate pool—for appointments as
arbitrators . . . .”335 Cole suggests considering sending arbitrator lists to
parties with 40% to 50% of the arbitrators of a diverse background to
increase the likelihood that a diverse arbitrator is chosen.336 Providing
parties with lists containing a minimum percentage of diverse arbitrators
would increase the chances that such arbitrators are selected to serve.337
3.

Alternative Paths to Chair Qualification

Finally, FINRA should consider revisiting the requirements for chair
qualification and assess whether obtaining experience on one to two larger
cases is essential for an arbitrator to be qualified to hear a smaller claim.
331. FINRA, RULE 12105(a) (2008) (entitled “Agreement of the Parties”).
332. La Rue & Symonette, supra note 125, at 221–22 (describing lawyer risk aversion and party
preference for maintaining status quo).
333. See id. at 230–34 (describing how having more minority applicants in employment finalist
pool results in greater likelihood of a woman or person of color being hired than when the majority
of the finalist pool is white and male).
334. Id. at 239 (describing the Ray Corollary Initiative); see also Mistry, supra note 83
(“[P]ractitioners could aim to consider at least 30 percent diverse candidates in selecting a panel.”).
Citing the Ray Corollary Initiative, the International Institute for Conflict Prevention & Resolution
aims for 30% of its panels to be diverse. See National Task Force on Diversity: Diversity
Commitment, CPR https://www.cpradr.org/programs/committees/diversity-task-force-adr/index/
_res/id=Attachments/index=0/Diversity%20Pledge%202020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CS7C-YR3P]
(“To facilitate the selection of diverse neutrals, we will endeavor to include diverse neutrals on any
slate of candidates we are asked to provide to the parties, to provide a slate that is made up of at least
30% diverse candidates; and when given the opportunity to make a default appointment, to appoint
at least 30% diverse neutrals.” (footnote omitted)).
335. La Rue & Symonette, supra note 125, at 245.
336. Cole, Arbitrator Diversity, supra note 1, at 987.
337. Id. (describing why mandated percentages of diverse arbitrators increase chances for
underrepresented arbitrators to be appointed).
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At the time chair qualification rules were proposed, it was understood that
the chair qualification requirement would be difficult for arbitrators to
obtain,338 though FINRA did not assess how parties’ request for a chair in
larger cases would impact smaller, less complicated claims.339 Identifying
the characteristics that FINRA hopes those overseeing smaller claims to
have while presiding over the cases and identifying other opportunities for
pursuing them—from mock arbitration proceedings to shadowing an
experienced arbitrator—may better serve investors with smaller claims.340
In the FINRA forum, participating in an initial prehearing conference
(IPHC) in a larger case may provide an arbitrator sufficient experience to
oversee a Simplified Arbitration proceeding.341 Alternative paths to chair
qualification would permit new arbitrators more opportunities to gain the
experience to serve as chair and deepen the diversity of the public, chairqualified arbitrator pool. Increasing the diversity of the public, chairqualified arbitrator pool would benefit the investors whose trust in the
FINRA arbitral forum is most crucial—investors with smaller claims.
Transparency and rule interventions work in tandem. Increased
transparency and changes to selection and qualification rules work
together to eliminate barriers preventing true inclusion. Without more
complete information, it is not possible to determine where barriers to
inclusion may exist in FINRA arbitrator selection, and without changes to
the selection and qualification rules, it is not possible to eliminate barriers
to inclusion that have been identified through the study of transparent
information. Subsequent transparency will permit study of the impact of
rule changes and whether more remains to be done.
338. See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Amending Code of Arbitration Procedure for
Customer Disputes and Industry Disputes Relating to Broadening Chairperson Eligibility, Exchange
Act Release No. 78,729, 81 Fed. Reg. 61,288 (Sept. 6, 2016); Order Approving Proposed Rule
Change Amending Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes and Industry Disputes
Relating to Broadening Chairperson Eligibility, Exchange Act Release No. 79,455, 81 Fed. Reg.
88,720 (Dec. 8, 2016).
339. Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Amending Code of Arbitration Procedure for
Customer Disputes and Industry Disputes Relating to Broadening Chairperson Eligibility, Exchange
Act Release No. 78,729, 81 Fed. Reg. 61,288 (Sept. 6, 2016); Order Approving Proposed Rule
Change Amending Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes and Industry Disputes
Relating to Broadening Chairperson Eligibility, Exchange Act Release No. 79,455, 81 Fed. Reg.
88,720 (Dec. 8, 2016). It is not always the case that a smaller dollar amount claim means that a case
is less complicated. See, e.g., Iannarone, supra note 309, at 1 (“Our clients are regular people who
have ‘small’ claims—$100,000 or less. Many of our cases are $50,000 or less, qualifying them for
simplified arbitration, yet those matters are anything but simple.”).
340. See, e.g., La Rue & Symonette, supra note 125, at 223 (“Many experienced arbitrators
sometimes have the new person ‘shadow write’, write a second award on the same matter in order to
have the experienced arbitrator review and critique the novice’s analysis and drafting skills.”).
341. FINRA, RULE 12500 (2018) (describing initial prehearing conference and matters considered
therein).
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CONCLUSION
This Article has used the FINRA forum as a case study for examining
diversity and inclusion efforts in an arbitration forum with more
transparency than most. In so doing, it identified the importance of
diversity and inclusion to ensuring the forum’s legitimacy and how rules
put into place to professionalize the arbitrator corps may prevent new, and
more diverse, arbitrators from serving. Experiential requirements for
arbitrator service, put into place at the request of litigants, are structural
barriers that make it difficult for new entrants into one arbitrator pool to
preside over smaller claims. Though the potential for such a result was
recognized when the requirements were put into place, their impact in
practice had not previously been examined. Selection processes
preferencing the most-experienced arbitrators likewise limit
diversification and inclusion efforts. Study of FINRA’s public data
indicates that while it has taken meaningful steps to diversify the arbitrator
pool, virtually none of the newly recruited arbitrators subsequently
preside over claims involving smaller dollar amounts. The study results
illustrate the limits of current transparency and the necessity of additional
information to fully evaluate whether arbitrator selection practices and
diversity endeavors result in inclusion. In addition, the findings provide
an additional lens from which to evaluate rulemaking intended to improve
the arbitration process to ensure that changes intended to improve one
aspect of the process do not decrease gains in another. The rules related
to arbitrator qualification and selection must be reevaluated in order to
ensure diversity efforts result in measurable inclusion. Arbitration forums
committed to diversity and inclusion must take steps to increase
transparency to ensure that inclusion aims are subject to third-party study
and analysis and eliminate barriers to inclusion identified by such inquiry.
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